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A Case Against ACTA
Abstract
The Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is being considered by the Obama Administration as an
Executive Order. If signed, this Order will greatly enhance controls placed at the borders of 36 countries to
attempt to stop the international flow of so-called counterfeit goods. To remove the social, political and
emotional sensitivity, I adopt the value neutral term of “imitative commodity” to describe what some call
counterfeits, knockoffs, pirates, etc. This article uses just three manufacturers of luxury status goods to
consider whether the ACTA will have positive or negative consequences. It concludes that the data supporting
the need for the ACTA is overstated and unverified, that the ACTA is actually not responsive to the precise
problem which it purports to correct, that the ACTA merely acts a policy laundering getting the Obama
Administration something they fear they could not get in the public law forum, and consists of vague and
misdirected border measures and criminal provisions. The ACTA is raised in the context of international
terrorism supporting and/or maintaining the imitative commodity industry. However, just like the value of
the imitative commodity industry, the value of actual support the imitative commodity industry receives from
terrorists and the benefit derived to terrorists is grossly overstated. In fact, there are many positive elements to
imitative commodity. Some claim it is actually socially optimal to have some imitative commodity. Imitative
commodities operate as free advertising for the legitimate good maker. Imitative commodities improve the
goodwill of a legitimate good maker. The shear existence of imitative commodities allows legitimate high-end
makers to sustain otherwise unsustainable prices for their luxury status goods. In the end, we have vilified
imitative commodities makers without giving thorough and analytical thought to the economic, social or legal
advantages made possible by some imitative commodities. This article is about quantity not quality. The
ACTA operates as a sledge hammer to kill an ant. The ACTA works to make public the intellectual property
rights of some manufacturers that used to be private. As such, the ACTA also operates as a corporate bailout.
What is required is a nuanced solution to a nuanced problem.
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A CASE AGAINST THE ACTA
Kenneth L. Port*
ABSTRACT
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is being consi-
dered by the Obama Administration as an executive order. If signed,
this order will greatly enhance controls placed at the borders of thirty-
seven countries to attempt to stop the international flow of so-called
counterfeit goods. To remove the social, political, and emotional stig-
ma, I adopt the value-neutral term imitative commodity to describe
what some call counterfeits, knockoffs, or pirated goods, among others.
This Article uses just three manufacturers of luxury status goods to
consider whether the ACTA will have optimal or negative conse-
quences. It concludes that the data supporting the need for the ACTA is
overstated and unverified; that the ACTA is actually not responsive to
the precise problem that it purports to correct; that the ACTA merely
acts as policy laundering, getting the Obama Administration something
it fears it could not get through the public-law forum; and that the AC-
TA consists of vague and misdirected border measures and criminal
provisions. The ACTA is raised in the context of international terrorism
supporting or maintaining the imitative-commodity industry. However,
just like the value of the imitative-commodity industry, the value of the
actual support the imitative-commodity industry receives from terrorists
and the benefit derived by terrorists is grossly overstated. In fact, there
are many positive elements to imitative commodities. Some claim it is
actually socially optimal to have some imitative commodities. Imitative
commodities operate as free advertising for the legitimate good maker.
Imitative commodities improve the goodwill of a legitimate good-
maker. The sheer existence of imitative commodities allows legitimate
high-end makers to sustain otherwise unsustainable prices for their
luxury status goods. In the end, we have vilified imitative-commodities
makers without giving thorough and analytical thought to the economic,
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social, or legal advantages made possible by some imitative commodi-
ties. This Article is about quantity, not quality. The ACTA operates as a
sledge hammer to kill an ant. It works to make public the intellectual
property rights of some manufacturers that used to be private. As such,
the ACTA also operates as a corporate bailout. What is required in-
stead is a nuanced solution to a nuanced problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Many economists have made clear and persuasive critiques of the
problems surrounding so-called counterfeit goods. These arguments are
significant; however, many equally qualified economists and even so-
cial scientists have also argued that there may be some social benefit in
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counterfeit goods. One thing is certain: economists do not agree on the
role of, the size of, or the solution to the counterfeit-goods industry.
This Article, therefore, is an inquiry into whether or not there is
anything positive about counterfeit goods.' The arguments against
counterfeit goods have been made clear. But is there a cogent counte-
rargument? 2 This Article argues that there is. The Obama and Bush
Administrations have listened to only one side of this issue. The Ad-
ministrations have created a new trade agreement called the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). This Agreement attempts to
stem the tide of free movement of counterfeit goods in the developed
world. It provides enforcement mechanisms to stop shipments of coun-
terfeit goods across multiple international borders. In that sense, it may
be a good thing.
On the other hand, the ACTA and its creators accept as truth one
side of the analysis. The ACTA gives no apparent credence or even
consideration to the idea that there may be some social good in counter-
feiting. It paints with a very broad brush to address the problems sur-
rounding counterfeit goods; however, counterfeit goods are an extreme-
ly nuanced problem. Some counterfeit goods seem normatively bad in
any amount; other types of counterfeit goods, when produced in mod-
eration, may benefit manufacturers. The ACTA, however, makes all
counterfeit goods bad and treats them all the same way. The ACTA also
criminalizes the possession of counterfeit goods, even though purchas-
ers are often fooled into buying the counterfeit good. Therefore, we
need a nuanced solution to this nuanced problem. This Article attempts
to analyze some of this nuance.
To do this, I first attempt to remove the social, political, and emo-
tional sensitivity from this subject by adopting the neutral term imitative
commodities3 to describe what the literature and the press refer to as
I This Article is not about nor does it in anyway defend the use of child labor or the working
conditions, poor wages, or intimidation that may accompany the production of imitative com-
modities. That dark side is well-documented and may be a serious component of the production
of these goods. The horrible stories that proliferate that discussion merit individual attention and
are therefore beyond the scope of this piece. Also beyond the scope of this piece are products
such as counterfeit drugs, car parts, and food products because the thesis of this Article is narrow-
ly crafted to be responsive to status goods-and only some specific status goods at that.
2 The recently released report on Media Piracy in Emerging Economies contemplates this
very question from the perspective of copyrights. It questions what will happen to world econo-
mies if the enforcement of illicit copyrights is successful. What will be the result of no pirated
copyrighted subject matter? See Soc. Sol. RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/50196972/
MPEE-1-0-1 (concluding that media piracy around the world is more appropriately characterized
as a pricing issue, because media goods are simply unavailable for purchase by most in the de-
veloping world, yet many do have at their disposal a computer with an Internet connection, mak-
ing piracy of media goods inevitable).
3 The term appears to have been first used by history professor Maxine Berg and material
culture curator Dr. Helen Clifford, both of the University of Warwick, in 1999. CONSUMERS AND
2012] 1133
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counterfeit goodS4 or knockoffs,5 among other pejorative terms. To
demonstrate that this is an extremely complicated question, this Article
focuses on three manufacturers of luxury status goods. The conclusion
that is reached by others is that any amount of imitative commodities is
a negative that needs to be eradicated.6 This Article demonstrates that
firms and governments should strive for equilibrium between the posi-
tive benefits of some counterfeit goods and the negative effects of too
many. Lumping all counterfeiting activity together and labeling it all as
qualitatively and quantitatively "bad" is misguided. This Article focuses
LUXURY: CONSUMER CULTURE IN EUROPE 1650-1850, at 164 (Maxine Berg & Helen Clifford
eds., 1999). Professor Berg and Dr. Clifford have written many articles and books relating to the
history of consumer consumption of luxury goods in Europe from the seventeenth to nineteenth
centuries. In 2002, Professor Berg made the argument that copying luxury goods results in inno-
vations and has, throughout history, led to improvements in welfare as more and better items
become available to more people-a thought shared by the author of this Article as well. Maxine
Berg, From Imitation to Invention: Creating Commodities in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 55
EcoN. HIST. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
4 The Lanham Act identifies trademark counterfeiting as the act of producing, selling, or
distributing a product with a "spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistin-
guishable from, a registered mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). The U.S. Department of State
defines counterfeiting as:
The act of producing or selling a product containing a sham mark that is an intentional
and calculated reproduction of the genuine mark. A "counterfeit mark" is identical to
or substantially indistinguishable from the genuine mark. Often, counterfeit goods are
made to imitate a popular product in all details of construction and appearance so as to
deceive customers into thinking they are purchasing the genuine merchandise.
BUREAU OF INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Focus ON: INTELLECTUAL PROPER-
TY RIGHTS 91 (2006), available at www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/iprbook.pdf#.
5 A knockoff is "[a]n identical copy of a work or product protected by patent, trademark,
trade dress, copyright." BUREAU OF INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, supra note 4, at 94. "Knockoff
products may seem the same as branded products, but they do not abuse the copyrights, patents or
trademarks (intellectual property) of any manufacturer." PEGGY CHAUDHRY & ALAN ZIMMER-
MAN, THE ECONOMICS OF COUNTERFEIT TRADE: GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMERS, PIRATES AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (2009).
6 There is an abundance of commentator and government remarks regarding the potential
economic, social, and psychological dangers imitative commodities might bring upon man,
thereby, either directly or indirectly insinuating that we are all better off without these items. See
Kate Betts, The Purse-Party Blues, TIME MAG., Aug. 2, 2004, at 68 ("Ten years ago, we said [the
counterfeit goods industry] wasn't a problem, that it was even proof of our success .... Nobody
says that now. We see it as an economic and even a social danger." (quoting Marc-Antoine Ja-
met, then president of France's anticounterfeiting lobby group, Union des Fabricants (UNIFAB),
and secretary general of LVMH); Morality: Rose-coloured Spectacles?, ECONOMIST, June 26,
2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16422414 (discussing the results of a recent
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill study, released in Psychological Science, about the
effect of counterfeit goods on our psyches) ("[W]earing fake goods makes you feel a fake your-
self, and causes you to be more dishonest in other matters than you would otherwise be."). Some-
times the titles of articles and reports alone clearly demonstrate the desperate tone and hyperdra-
matic viewpoints on counterfeit goods contained within. See, e.g., INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEITING
COAL., WHITE PAPER: THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY THEFT: ECONOMIC HARM, THREATS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY, AND
LINKS TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, available at
http://counterfeiting.unicri.it/docs/International%20AntiCounterfeiting%20Coalition.White%20P
aper.pdf.
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on the quantitative issues surrounding and imbuing the analysis of im-
itative commodities.
In the U.S. government and public media, the hyperbole regarding
the negative effects of imitative commodities has become replete. Some
estimates claim that the United States is losing $250 billion a year to
imitative commodities7 and that the total worldwide value of imitative
commodities exceeds $600 billion.8 If this claim is correct, some 1.7%
of the United States's gross domestic product (GDP) walks out the door
each year in the form of imitative commodities.9 Further, some claim
that 750,000 U.S. jobs are lost because of the existence of imitative
commodities. 10
These numbers are suspicious. The claimants of these massive,
fuzzy numbers make inaccurate assumptions about purchasing patterns.
For example, it simply is not true that every sale of a counterfeit good
displaces a sale of a legitimate good at the retail price commanded by
that good." The motivations people have for purchasing imitative
commodities vary greatly and sometimes appear unclear. 12 One popular
belief is that only people who cannot afford the legitimate good will
buy imitative commodities.' 3 Others argue that education level contri-
7 CHAUDHRY & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 13 ("There is some confusion as to the true
effect of counterfeit product upon US firms. As long ago as 1994 estimates of US losses stood at
$200 billion per year. The US Customs service recently estimated that the US economy was
losing between $200 and $250 billion per year and a total of 750,000 American jobs because of
product counterfeiting. It is not clear whether these figures are meant to refer to lost sales on a
worldwide or domestic basis. Since many US firms achieve up to 50% of their sales in overseas
markets it seems reasonable to believe that this figure most likely includes all worldwide sales.
Certainly in order to agree with the OECD estimate of $200 billion on a worldwide basis, the
effect on US markets would have to be far smaller." (citations omitted)).
8 World estimates of the global market value of the counterfeit industry seem to have coa-
lesced around $500 to $600 billion annually. The Truth About Counterfeiting, INT'L ANTICoUN-
TERFEITING COAL., http://www.iacc.orglabout-counterfeiting/the-truth-about-counterfeiting.php
(last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
9 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Estimated annual losses of $250 billion are 1.7%
of $14,624.184 billion, the United States's GDP in 2010. INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE, OCTOBER 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/
2010/02/weodata/download.aspx (click "By Countries" hyperlink).
10 See CHAUDHRY & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 13.
11 The major assumption upon which most counterfeit economic analysis rests is that "the
market for legal versions of the product and the market for pirated products perfectly overlap."
Julio 0. De Castro et al., Can Entrepreneurial Firms Benefit from Product Piracy?, 23 J. Bus.
VENTURING 75, 79 (2008). However, this assumption is not always correct. Both the quality gap
and the cost differential between the legal product and imitative commodity will inversely affect
the amount of overlap the two markets have. Id.
12 David S. Wall & Joanna Large, Jailhouse Frocks: Locating the Public Interest in Policing
Counterfeit Luxury Fashion Goods, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1094, 1099 (2010) ("This is be-
cause where consumer desire is the driver, not everything is cut and dried.").
13 A common theory called the "snob effect" suggests that people intentionally buy luxury
goods to gain social position and stay ahead of the fashion pack. See id at 1100. This theory
leads to the prevailing thought that those who want the social position that they believe status
goods give them, but who cannot afford the authentic goods, search out the cheaper imitative
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1135 2011-2012
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butes to the decision to purchase imitative commodities.14 Still others
claim that the decision to purchase an imitative commodity is simply an
attempt to fit in with a society obsessed with status.' 5 Some research
shows that it is not the extrinsic qualities of a person that drives him to
make the purchase, but the intrinsic qualities, including his attitude to-
ward counterfeiting, cultural values, ethical perspective, product
attributes, and shopping experience.' 6 Motivations behind purchasing
imitative commodities is beyond the scope of this Article; however, this
fuzzy math and these fuzzy motivations are used to convince people that
any amount of imitative commodities is bad, and that the public gov-
ernments around the world need to enforce private intellectual property
rights.
The claim that 750,000 jobs in the United States have been lost to
imitative commodities has had a profound impact on policy generated
by the Obama Administration. Behind closed doors in a tightly-kept
secret process,' 7 the Administration has negotiated with thirty-six coun-
commodities to fill that void. Studies have shown, however, that "buyers of counterfeits [are]
spread across the demographic spectrum, thus overturning the common perception that they are
low-income consumers." Id. at 1101.
14 In 1995, researchers sought to determine who was buying counterfeit goods using age,
household income, and education as relevant factors. See Chow-Hou Wee et al., Non-Price De-
terminants of Intention to Purchase Counterfeit Goods: An Exploratory Study, 12 INT'L MAR-
KETING REV. 19, 24-25 (1995). The researchers expected to find that
the frequency to buy counterfeit goods would vary across respondents in term of age,
level of education, and income. Overall, the researchers' felt that wisdom comes with
age, judgment with more education, and the higher purchasing power related to in-
creased income would co-variate with other non-price determinants of consumer com-
plicity to buy fake products. However, in this study the researchers reveal that only "at-
titude towards counterfeiting" appeared in the majority of their models as an
explanatory variable in terms of predicting a willingness to purchase counterfeit, and
"age" could not be used as a segmentation variable. For one product, purchasing pi-
rated software, one demographic variable, "educational attainment," was determined to
be a significant factor.
CHAUDHRY & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 69.
15 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
16 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17 The ACTA negotiation process seems to be a direct contradiction to the transparency-in-
government platform that President Obama pushed since running for office in 2008. In fact, on
January 21, 2009, his first full day in office, Obama signed an executive order and two presiden-
tial memoranda heralding what he called a "new era of openness." President Obama Embraces
Openness on Day One, as Urged by the National Security Archive and a Coalition of More than
60 Organizations, NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/news/
20090121/index.htm. That same theme of transparency was extended in 2010 to intellectual
property enforcement when the Obama Administration explicitly stated that "information and
information sharing are critical to effective enforcement. The U.S. Government will thus support
transparency in the development of enforcement policy.... The Administration supports im-
proved transparency in intellectual property enforcement policy-making and international negoti-
ations." EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 8 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN],
available at http://stopfakes.gov/pdf/IPEC JointStrategicPlan.pdf. In a reply letter concerning
the transparency of the ACTA, Ambassador Ron Kirk wrote that the Obama Administration had
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1136 2011-2012
2012] A CASE AGAINST THE ACTA 1137
tries18 a new framework to respond to what they claim is necessary to
combat counterfeit goods. Taking its lead from Japan,19 rather than ne-
gotiating a multinational treaty that would have taken years to create
and ratify, the Administration, with its thirty-six partner countries, has
created the ACTA.20 It may sound like a treaty, but it is not. The ACTA
will likely be implemented in the United States as an executive order.
The initial step in the process was to have Ambassador Miriam Shapiro,
the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, go to Tokyo to attend a signing
taken "unprecedented" steps "to promote transparency around the nation's international trade
agenda." Letter from Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative, to Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator from
Oregon 5 (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfmsend/1700. Ambassador Kirk
then went on to list specific steps his office took
to improve transparency and stakeholder outreach in connection with the ACTA nego-
tiations. For example in 2009, USTR:
* established a dedicated ACTA webpage on the new USTR website;
* issued and updated the first public summary of issues under negotiation, which
is also available on the ACTA web page;
* started releasing public agendas on the ACTA web page before each meeting;
* sought advice from a broad group of experts, including representatives of IP
right holders, Internet intermediaries, NGOs, and others, about prospective
U.S. positions on LPR enforcement in the digital environment; and
* provided links on the ACTA web page to relevant portions of past agreements,
for review by members of the public who are interested in understanding the
U.S. approach to possible legal framework positions of the ACTA.
Id. While all of this may be true, it is minor compared to the vast amount of undisclosed informa-
tion, discussions, and revelations of the parties involved in creating the ACTA, something Am-
bassador Kirk appears to quickly brush away at the end of his letter by adding, "The Administra-
tion also recognizes that confidentiality in international negotiations is sometimes necessary to
enable officials of participating governments to engage in frank exchanges of views, positions,
and specific negotiating proposals, and thereby facilitate agreement on complex issues." Id
18 Parties to the ACTA include thirty-seven countries: Japan, United States, Canada, Euro-
pean Union (twenty-seven countries), Switzerland, Australia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
South Korea, and Singapore.
19 Timothy P. Trainer & Vicki E. Allums, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Across
Borders Database, WL § 6:1 (2010) ("In 2005, Japan's Strategic Council on Intellectual Property
had called for tougher government measures and promoted the idea of an international treaty
aimed at tightening border enforcement. Japan's idea has evolved and in October 2007, the U.S.
and numerous other governments, including Japan and members of the European Union, an-
nounced that they would begin negotiating the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).").
20 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
webfn send/2417 [hereinafter ACTA Final]; Consolidated Text: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, Oct. 2, 2010, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfn send/2338 [hereinafter ACTA
Draft]. The Obama Administration claims that the ACTA is consistent with its strategy for intel-
lectual property enforcement because it establishes a "state-of-the-art international framework
that provides a model for effectively combating global proliferation of commercial-scale counter-
feiting and piracy in the 21st century." Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
ACTA Fact Sheet and Guide to Public Draft Text (Oct. 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/fact-sheets/2010/acta-fact-sheet-and-guide-public-draft-text. It claims that the
ACTA also includes "innovative provisions to deepen international cooperation" and that it
promotes "strong enforcement practices." Id. Together, the Administration claims, "these provi-
sions will help to protect American jobs in innovative and creative industries against intellectual
property theft." Id.
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ceremony on October 1, 2011.21 As of this writing, the executive order
has not been signed.
As an executive order, it is not subject to the normal ratification
process in the Senate. 22 It has the effect of law when executed. 23 Al-
though subsequent presidents can disagree and are free to end the prior
president's executive orders at will,24 for the next two years, it would be
the law of the land.
Although the media and Congress have come to believe that any
amount of imitative commodities are unacceptable, 25 in fact, a certain
21 Nate Anderson, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Slouches Toward Signing on Satur-
day, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/09/
anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement-slouches-toward-signing-this-saturday.ars.
22 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 368 (3d ed.
2006).
A treaty is an agreement between the United States and a foreign country that is ne-
gotiated by the president and is effective when ratified by the Senate. An executive
agreement, in contrast, is an agreement between the United States and a foreign coun-
try that is effective when signed by the president and the head of the other government.
In other words, if the document is labeled "treaty," Senate approval is required. If the
document is tided "executive agreement," no Senate ratification is necessary.
Id Generally speaking, modern presidents use presidential orders as a means to initiate and
advance many of their own personally important policies. See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory
President, 90 IOWA L. REv. 539, 548 (2005). It can be easily argued that ACTA is an example of
the Obama Administration's own personally important policy given the lack of transparency in
the creation of the document and the lack of hard, proven facts to support such a global initiative.
23 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (stating that under the Supremacy Clause a
treaty is "Law of the Land" and that international executive agreements have a "similar dignity");
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 369 ("Executive agreements, like treaties, prevail over state law
and policy.").
24 See Stack, supra note 22 ("The president may issue or repeal prior presidential orders on
his own initiative, and in almost all cases, may do so without having to satisfy any procedural
requirements. Moreover, with appropriate constitutional or statutory authorization, these orders
may have the force and effect of law. As a result, presidential orders often leave other institu-
tions, such as Congress, administrative agencies and the courts, as well as the public in the posi-
tion of responding to or implementing the policy and law they embody.").
25 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE and CBP Release
2010 Report on Counterfeit Seizures (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/
1103/110316washingtondc.htm?f-m ("The risks of counterfeit products go beyond damaging the
reputation of a name on a label; consumers can put their health, or even their lives, at risk when
they purchase seemingly harmless items such as medicines, perfume and holiday lights. Ultimate-
ly, the cost of purchasing a fake product is much greater than the savings and may result in cata-
strophic consequences." (quoting Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id ("The protection of intellectual property is a top
priority for Homeland Security Investigations, as counterfeit products represent a triple threat by
delivering shoddy and sometimes dangerous, goods into commerce, by funding organized crimi-
nal activities and by denying Americans good-paying jobs." (quoting John T. Morton, Director,
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. ("Trade in
counterfeit and pirated goods poses significant threats to the United States innovation-based
economy, the competitiveness of our businesses, the livelihoods of U.S. workers, and in some
cases, national security and the health and safety of consumers."); John Crudele, Terror-Tied
Goods: Knockoff Profiteering Caught on Spy Cam, N.Y. POST, Mar. 15, 2011, at 30 ("While the
cheap fakes are produced in China, the US wholesale operation of these counterfeits is dominated
by Middle Eastern men, many of whom are sympathetic to Hezbollah, the Middle East terrorist
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1138 2011-2012
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level of imitative commodities have positive effects for some status
goods. 26 That is, if the ACTA is successful in eliminating imitative
commodities, some manufacturers would recognize economic damage.
Their very role as a status good might be threatened. The existence of
imitative commodities reduces the pressure on manufacturers of legiti-
mate goods to ever put status goods on sale. The existence of imitative
commodities operates as a powerful advertising tool, free of charge, for
the legitimate-good manufacturer. Finally, the goodwill behind legiti-
mate goods actually improves with the existence of imitative commodi-
ties in the marketplace. All of these benefits accrue at no cost to the
manufacturer of the legitimate good.
organization.... Once [an undercover investigator] was speaking Arabic and another buyer, who
was checking out handbags, started discussing Middle East politics. The other guy said he liked
Hezbollah, the Middle East terrorist organization, and he was a particular fan of Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad."); Beth DeFalco, Authorities Crack Down on Flea Market Fakes,
Wash. Times, Jan. 2, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011 /jan/2/authorities-crack-
down-on-flea-market-fakes ("You support organized crime, gang activity, and terrorist organiza-
tions that use [sales of counterfeit goods] as a funding mechanism.... This isn't a victimless
crime." (quoting Robert Barchiesi, President, Int'l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., as he comments on a
recent flea market raid in New Jersey) (internal quotation marks omitted)). While the New York
Post claims that the investigation was originally an attempt to show how many millions of tax
dollars were lost as a result of the "foreign-made knockoffs," the focus of the article shifted to the
"bigger problem": proving that counterfeit goods are supporting terrorism because one man
interested in counterfeit goods expressed that he may be partial to Middle Eastern topics that the
United States has deemed wrong or bad. Id.; see also Targeting Websites Dedicated to Stealing
American Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1
(2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("Copyright
piracy and the sale of counterfeit goods are reported to cost the American economy billions of
dollars annually and hundreds of thousands of lost jobs."); Jennifer Martinez, US. Unveils Broad
Anti-Piracy Effort, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2010, at B2 ("Whether we're talking about fake drugs
that hurt ... or knock-off car tires that fall apart at 65 miles per hour causing injury and death,
counterfeits kill...." (quoting Vice President Joe Biden's comments on Obama Administration
counterfeit-goods initiatives) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nicholas Schmidle, Inside the
Knockoff Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at MM38 ("Counterfeiters played a low-budget
game of industrial espionage, bribing employees at the licensed factories to lift samples or copy
blueprints.").
26 Ironically, the benefit of counterfeit goods seems to be most touted by the actual designers
of the original goods themselves. For example, Marc Jacobs, an internationally acclaimed and
highly successful designer of high-end luxury goods for Louis Vuitton as well as his own lines,
Marc Jacobs and Marc by Marc Jacobs-both also owned by LVMH-sees nothing wrong with
counterfeit goods. In fact, when asked about counterfeiting, he said he thought it was "fantastic"
because "as long as I've been here, everything we have done has been copied .... We hope to
create a product that is desirable." DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: How LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER
276 (2007). The feeling that imitation is the best indicator of success seems to be echoed by
Prada CEO Patrizio Bertelli, who has said that counterfeiting is simply a part of "the game of
fashion." Id. In fact, Bertelli stated that he "would be more worried if [his] product wasn't co-
pied." Id. The general consensus among designers seems to be that if their goods are not being
counterfeited then they have a much bigger problem on their hands: failure to achieve status,
desirability, and commercial success. See also infra Part II (observing per-units are higher in a
marketplace including counterfeit manufacturers than in a marketplace without counterfeit manu-
facturers).
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1139 2011-2012
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
The challenge, of course, is in determining the extent to which im-
itative commodities should be tolerated and the extent to which they
have a deleterious effect on the manufacturer of legitimate goods. One
thing is clear, extinguishing imitative commodities-the express intent
of the ACTA 27-may have a negative effect on the makers of legitimate
goods. In short, manufacturers of status goods like Coach, Richemont,
and Louis Vuitton should be careful with their lobbying objectives.
Imitative commodities are vilified both because of exaggerated
claims of their connection to international terrorism and because of the
conditions under which some imitative commodities are produced.
Painting with such a broad brush as the ACTA does, including crimina-
lizing the possession of imitative commodities while not squarely ad-
dressing the source, will likely have no better success than the various
"Drug Czars" that the various administrations have appointed to deal
with illicit drugs in the United States. A "just say no" 28 approach to
imitative commodities may make some feel better; however, it will do
nothing to stop the creation of these commodities. Moreover, it is not
clear what we really ought to do. As the data relied on to make the
claims of the horrific economic consequences of imitative commodities
is unreliable, what is called for is a complete rethinking of how to ad-
dress imitative commodities.
Before we shift the burden of enforcement of private intellectual
property rights from private parties to public entities, we ought to gather
and rely on better data. We ought not to simply vilify all imitative
commodities. If the various federal governments are to be asked to
come to the aid of some manufacturers who claim they are being im-
itated (as if that is a new and shocking occurrence) in the form of the
ACTA, we need to have better, verifiable data that imitative commodi-
ties are doing the harm claimed.
This Article first defines the narrow scope of imitative commodi-
ties to which it relates. Next, it describes luxury status goods as the sub-
set of imitative commodities most affected by the ACTA, and high-
lights the performance of three manufacturers of luxury status goods.
The Article then explains the confines of the ACTA and the claimed
effects. The Article next addresses the positive effects of imitative
commodities on the market place. Finally, the Article argues that when
accounting for the cost of enforcement (including the enactment of laws
27 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 20 ("Consistent with the
[Obama] Administration's strategy for intellectual property enforcement, ACTA establishes a
state-of-the-art international framework that provides a model for effectively combating global
proliferation of commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy in the 21st century.").
28 This not so thinly veiled reference to Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" antidrug campaign is,
of course, meant to highlight the fact that this campaign against imitative commodities is no
better than her ineffective attempt to stop the use of illicit drugs in America.
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like the ACTA), it is counterproductive for some manufacturers to at-
tempt to stop all imitative commodities.
I. IMITATIVE COMMODITIES
Imitative commodities are sometimes referred to as counterfeit
goods, knockoff goods, or various combinations of these and other
terms.29 However, there is a technical distinction between knockoff
goods and counterfeit goods.
Knockoff goods are goods manufactured with the intent to be simi-
lar to a legitimate trademark holder's goods but made in a way that
would not create a likelihood of confusion.30 An example of this is
where a producer of imitative commodities manufactures purses with a
large, brown letter on the goods that appears to be a "C," thereby sug-
gesting the purse was manufactured by Coach.3 ' However, a brief look
or inquiry by a potential purchaser immediately discloses that the letter
is actually the letter "G" made to resemble the Coach "C."32 When no
consumer confusion is likely, the appropriate label is knockoff When
there is no fraud involved, merely an attempt to so imitate a status good
as to require a purchaser to look closely at the products to determine
that they are not genuine, a mere knockoff good is produced, not a
counterfeit.
Counterfeit goods are intentionally fraudulent goods.33 With the
intent to displace the sales of legitimate goods, counterfeit goods are
passed off as the real good, confusing consumers into believing that
they are buying the legitimate good when, in fact, they are not.34 Some
29 These terms include: fake, imitation, knockoff counterfeit, pirated, copycat, look-alike, and
replicas. See Lyn S. Amine & Peter Magnusson, Cost-Benefit Models of Stakeholders in the
Global Counterfeiting Industry and Marketing Response Strategies, 15 MULTINATIONAL BUS.
REV. 63 (2007).
30 Cf De Castro et al., supra note 11, at 78 n.3.
31 See Counterfeit Education, COACH, http://www.coach.com/online/handbags/genWCM-
10551-10051-en-/Coach_US/CustomerService/ReportingCounterfeits (last visited Feb. 16, 2011)
(indicating the Coach "C" as one of the company's signature trademarks, used to identify coun-
terfeits).
32 Cf Nicole Giambarrese, Comment, The Look for Less: A Survey of Intellectual Property
Protections in the Fashion Industry, 26 TOURO L. REV. 243, 258 (2010) ("The purse that is
identical to the Chanel original, but bears interlocking '0' s, [sic] [instead of the distinctive
interlocking 'C's,] may not be illegal to sell or manufacture. This purse is not counterfeit; rather,
it is a knock-off.").
33 See De Castro et al., supra note 11, at 78 n.3; see also Umang Singh II, Counterfeit, Medi-
cines and ACTA 1 (Dec. 13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1725072.
34 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 402 (9th ed. 2009) (defining counterfeit as "[tlo unlawfully
forge, copy, or imitate an item . . with the intent to deceive or defraud by presenting the item as
genuine").
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counterfeit goods are difficult to detect. For example, some producers
of counterfeit goods employ small children to create an accurate replica
of the fine stitching on a handbag to conceal the fact that it is a counter-
feit good. 35
There turns out to be a large amount of overlap between the uses
of these terms in literature. 36 These terms are sometimes used syn-
onymously," despite their definitional and connotative differences. In
addition, a knockoff good becomes a counterfeit once it is adjudicated
to have gone too far.38 That is, when a knockoff good is determined by
a court to be confusingly similar and therefore in violation of the legi-
timate-good manufacturer's trademark, it ceases to be a mere knockoff
and becomes a counterfeit good. When the manufacturer of an adjudi-
cated counterfeit good prevails on appeal, it ceases being a counterfeiter
and becomes a mere knockoff producer again. 39
Also, the terms counterfeit goods and knockoffgoods have various
political connotations. 40 These terms are used most frequently in a
negative way to claim that their existence somehow harms all Ameri-
cans, as they allegedly harm the producers of the status goods for which
some people strive. 41
Therefore, as the terms are used interchangeably and defined in-
consistently, it becomes rather difficult to determine which is the cor-
rect nomenclature for the various goods in the marketplace. In this Ar-
35 Andrea Thompson, The Human Cost of a Fake Label, DAILY MAIL (UK), Mar. 14, 2005,
at 37 ("Seventy per cent of counterfeit items seized worldwide last year came from factories in
China, where young children are preferred because their nimble, small fingers are deemed more
suitable for the intricate stitching on small handbags that make the copies look so convincing.").
36 Instead of distinguishing between the terms counterfeit, knockoff and the like, some econ-
omists categorize counterfeits or knockoffs as deceptive or nondeceptive. See Gene M. Grossman
& Carl Shapiro, Counterfeit-Product Trade, 78 Am. ECON. REV. 59, 60 (1988).
37 See, e.g., Singh II, supra note 33, at 1 ("In the world [m]arket ... counterfeit goods are
commonly known as Knock Offs.").
38 See, e.g., People v. Rosenthal, No. 2002NY075570, 2003 WL 23962174, at *1 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. Mar. 4, 2003) ("[W]hile it is perfectly legal to sell merchandise that copies the design and
style of a product often referred to as 'knock-offs' it is against the law to sell goods that bear a
counterfeit trademark.").
39 Cf Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversing, for the second time,
the district court's failure to find trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair
competition).
40 See, e.g., Sandra L. Rierson, Pharmaceutical Counterfeiting and the Puzzle of Remedies, 8
WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 433, 433 (2008).
41 Much of the negativity stems from counterfeit pharmaceutical products and automobile
parts, which can cause substantial physical injury. See, e.g., Amir H. Khoury, A Neoconventional
Trademark Regime for "Newcomer" States, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 351, 379 (2010) ("[N]o data
proves widespread injuries from the use of counterfeit items of clothing or parts thereof In the
case of counterfeit pharmaceutical products, the danger appears more plausible."); Adam Powell,
Note, Benchmark Legislation: A Measured Approach in the Fight Against Counterfeit Pharma-
ceuticals, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 751 (2010) ("[C]ounterfeit pharmaceuticals often contain the
wrong or no active ingredients, or are contaminated by additional toxic chemicals or poor sterili-
zation practices. ... As a result, counterfeiters cause more damage in the realm of pharmaceuti-
cals than in more traditionally counterfeited products.").
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ticle, I adopt the term imitative commodity to describe a combination of
products that might be infringing and might not be infringing, or may
have formerly not been infringing but have been adjudicated to be in-
fringing. Since it is impossible to say at any given moment which goods
might be infringing and which might not be infringing, I adopt the val-
ue-neutral term of imitative commodity, which does not have the politi-
cally, socially, or legally negative connotations of other terms.
By adopting a neutral term, I do not mean to minimize the plight of
many people engaged in the manufacture of imitative commodities.
Some suffer horrible fates in the hands of monsters to make these
goods. 42 However, at a minimum, sound policy creation requires inves-
tigating all aspects of an effected industry to determine the best course
of action. This Article asks the reader to suspend the more commonly
discussed dark side of the manufacturing of imitative commodities. If
one is able to momentarily suspend these serious and legitimate con-
cerns, one sees that using the ACTA to paint with a broad brush 43 may
not be in the best interest of even the unfortunate people who are forced
into laboring to produce imitative commodities.
II. LUXURY STATUS GOODS AT ISSUE
Economists have long recognized the "Veblen Effect."44 Accord-
ing to the Veblen Effect, people tend to acquire objects for the status
that those objects represent,45 even if they are functionally equivalent to
a cheaper alternative. 46 Another term for the Veblen Effect is conspi-
cuous consumption.
42 Some of the cases involving child labor and counterfeit luxury goods are horrific. After
accompanying Chinese investigators on a raid of a counterfeit luxury goods factory where dozens
of children were present as workers, author Dana Thomas recalls a harrowing story one investiga-
tor told her:
"I remember walking into an assembly plant in Thailand a couple years ago and seeing
six or seven little children, all under ten years old, sitting on the floor assembling coun-
terfeit leather handbags," the investigator told me as we drove away from the raid.
"The owner had broken the children's legs and tied the lower leg to the thigh so the
bones wouldn't mend. He did it because the children said they wanted to go outside
and play."
THOMAS, supra note 26, at 288.
43 See Singh II, supra note 33, at 9 ("[The] ACTA . .. extends the meaning of counterfeiting
to much subjectivity and thus, increases its ambit to [a] variety of goods.").
44 See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC
STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS (1899).
45 See Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Burnheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspi-
cuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1996).
46 See id. at 349.
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Fred Hirsch coined the term positional goods to describe goods
whose value is derived from their scarcity or congestion through exces-
sive use. 4 7 Positional goods may be a result of a 'pure' social scarcity,"
where "satisfaction is derived from scarcity itself," or a "by-product of
positional goods," where "satisfaction is influenced by the extensive-
ness of use by others." 48 Later, Gene Grossman and Carl Shapiro used
the term status goods to describe "goods for which the mere use or dis-
play of a particular branded product confers prestige on their owners,
apart from any utility deriving from their function." 49 Status goods start
out as expensive, highly sought-after products and, over time, slowly
become attainable by all segments of society.50
Status goods comprise a substantial component of research and
development within developed economies around the world.5' Evolu-
tionary economist Keith Hudson, for example, argues that if the supply
of status goods falters, economic growth would also falter.52 He sug-
gests that if the availability of status goods falters, developed nations
will have to readjust if their economies are to survive.53
I do not claim, as Hudson seems to, that the existence of status
goods makes the American way of life itself possible; however, status
goods do play an important role in the American economy. To be sure,
47 FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 27 (1978) ("The positional economy, which is
the basis of Harrod's oligarchic wealth, relates to all aspects of goods, services, work positions,
and other social relationships that are either (1) scarce in some absolute or socially imposed sense
or (2) subject to congestion or crowding through more extensive use.").
48 Id. at 28-29. "[T]he satisfaction that individuals derive from goods and services depends in
increasing measure not only on their own consumption but on consumption by others as well." Id.
at 2; see also Fredrik Carlsson et al., Do You Enjoy Having More than Others? Survey Evidence
of Positional Goods, 74 ECONOMICA 586, 586 (2007) ("The idea that relative income and con-
sumption are important for people is far from new. Many prominent economists in the past,
including Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, Thorstein Veblen, Arthur
Pigou, John Maynard Keynes, John Kenneth Galbraith and Tibor Scitovsky, have seriously
discussed the observation that people seem to be concerned with their own income and consump-
tion relative to that of others.").
49 Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods, 103 Q.J.
ECON. 79, 82 (1988).
So "Like Hirsch's positional goods, status goods confer utility only at the expense of someone
who consumes less of the good." Ben Cooper et al., Status Effects and Negative Utility Growth,
Il l ECON. J. 642, 644 (2001). "The increased supply then entails a reduction in quality, in the
sense that a congested road is of lower quality than a clear one, which is a restraining influence
on demand." HIRSCH, supra note 47, at 31.
51 Cooper et al., supra note 50, at 644 ("[I]nnovative activity in the economy is increasingly
directed at the innovation of status goods. . . .").
52 Interpreting Fred Hirsch's "positional economy," Keith Hudson wrote that "the economy
will grind to a halt for motivational reasons rather than for reasons of resource shortages." Keith
Hudson, Status Goods and Positional Goods, EVOLUTIONARY ECON. (Nov. 25, 2003), http://
www.evolutionary-economics.org/KSH-Postings-Econ/178.html.
53 Id. ("Economic growth therefore needs this succession of status goods. But, as one be-
comes widespread with lower and lower profit margins, another one is needed in order to keep
the momentum going.").
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if they do falter, it would affect the American economy significantly,
and that effect would certainly be negative.
In light of the intricate nature of the imitative commodities indus-
try, status goods make a nicely confined segment to study. However,
others claim that there is a positive side to this story. Some economists
even claim that imitative commodities are socially optimal. 54 Imitative
commodities could reduce inefficiencies that result from monopoly
pricing and thereby expand output.55
If an equilibrium with imitative commodities can be attained
where there exists some imitative commodities and where the number
of firms is fixed (as opposed to a situation where imitative commodities
are purged), profits might actually be enhanced. 56 Rational consumers
are willing to pay more for better quality, and provided the claim is
credible and the good has not disappointed the consumer in the past,
price markups for the good increase with quality.57 The degree to which
a particular manufacturer can claim exclusivity depends on its ability to
maximize quality and charge a corresponding price.58 To the extent that
high-end status-goods manufacturers can claim exclusivity, perceptions
of quality increase correspondingly.59 The perception of quality is en-
hanced as imitative commodities hold the market for reduced-priced
goods. Thereby, the per-unit profits go up. If sales due to the imitative
commodities do not fall by too much, total profits increase. 60 When
profits increase in this scenario, it is because of the presence of imita-
tive commodities, not the converse. When imitative commodities enter
the market place, they reduce the pressure on firms to engage in mutual-
54 See Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 91.
S5 Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 220 (1986).
56 Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 36, at 70.
57 "Price markups rise as we move up the credibility constraint, so if quality increases due to
counterfeiting, so too do per-unit profits." Id at 68.
Each quality-conscious consumer accepts at face value the quality claim of any firm,
so long as the claim is credible and the consumer has not been disappointed by a prod-
uct bearing the particular label in the past. The consumer assesses credibility by deter-
mining whether, if believed, the firm has incentive to deliver on its promise. In equili-
brium, all firms produce their advertised quality. Thus, consumers' expectations about
quality are "rational."
Id at 63. "[P]romises of above-minimum quality can be credible only if firms earn premia over
their marginal costs. These premia provide the incentives for firms to maintain their reputations."
Id. at 64.
58 See id at 68 ("Home producers select (credible) prices and qualities to maximize quality-
conscious consumers' utilities. . . ").
59 See id. at 60 ("When governments grant firms exclusive property rights to their marks, they
protect firms' investments.").
60 Id at 73 ("With a fixed number of home firms, however, brand-name producers may raise
their quality in an effort to battle counterfeiters, and this quality enhancement may cause both
home and global welfare to rise. . . .").
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ly destructive competition.61 In the end, imitative-commodity producers
reduce the need for legitimate firms to compete by reducing prices,
quality, or both.62
This raises the question of how best to protect luxury status goods
from faltering. The Obama Administration and thirty-six other nations
believe the best course of action is to stamp out what they refer to as
counterfeit goods by adopting the ACTA. In order to test that idea
against my hypothesis, that some amount of imitative commodities
would be better for luxury status goods than none at all, this Article
presents a detailed analysis of Coach, Richemont, and Louis Vuitton.
Collectively, I refer to products that emanate from these three manufac-
turers as luxury status goods. This Article concludes that, at least for
these goods, the existence of some imitative commodities has a net pos-
itive effect, and that eliminating imitative commodities entirely, as the
ACTA attempts to do, would have a net negative effect on the manufac-
turers of these luxury status goods.
A. Coach
Coach reports that they are a very successful company. Especially
in the last three years, Coach has outperformed the Dow Jones Industri-
al Average (Dow) and the Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) by a
rather healthy margin. If one had invested $100 in Coach in 2000, that
$100 would be worth nearly $2000 in October of 2010.63 This outper-
forms the S&P 500 by a factor of one to twenty. In other words, as an
investment, Coach has been a very viable option.
61 Id. at 68 ("When profits increase, it is because the presence of counterfeiters limits the
intensity of mutually harmful competition among the legitimate firms.").
62 Id.
63 All available Coach stock data (NYSE:COH) was downloaded from Yahoo Finance, which
is available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=COH+Historical+Prices. After normalizing the
first available stock price to $100 and accounting for stock splits on July 5, 2002, October 2,
2003, and April 5, 2005, the value of Coach stock on February 18, 2011 was $2376.35, or 23.76
times greater than its original value. All data is on file with the author.
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Coach vs. DOW and S&P
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Regarding revenues, Coach has also performed very well, main-
taining an average annual revenue growth of twenty-four percent 64:
Coach Revenue ($ million)
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 209 2010
B. Louis Vuitton
Louis Vuitton is owned by LVMH MoZt Hennessy-Louis Vuitton
S.A. Similarly to Coach, LVMH has also drastically outperformed the
Dow and the S&P 500.65
64 All available Coach revenue data was downloaded from YCharts.com, which is available
at http://ycharts.com/companies/COI-/revenues. All data is on file with the author.
65 All available LVMH Mot Hennessy-Louis Vuitton S.A stock data (PAR:MC.PA) was
downloaded from Yahoo Finance, which is available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=
MC.PA+Historical+Prices. After normalizing the first available stock price to $100, the value of
LVMH stock on February 21, 2011 was $354.52, or 3.54 times greater than its original value. All
data is on file with the author.
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LVMH vs. DOW and S&P
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Most importantly, LVMH has maintained a very impressive record
for revenue generation. Even including the most serious recession in
U.S. history since the Great Depression, LVMH has maintained an av-
erage annual revenue growth of nearly eight percent 66:
LVMH Revenue ($ billion)
2004+ 200 2006 20j407 2008 2009 2010
In LVMH's annual report, the company proudly says that it is a
"growing" and "profitable" company. Nowhere in the annual report
does LVMH claim that counterfeit goods (or any other synonymous
term) amounted to any risk at all. 67
66 All available LVMH revenue data was downloaded from LVMH.com, which is available
at http://www.1 vmh.com/comfi/pg_rapports.asp. Euros were converted to dollars at the April 11,
2011 exchange rate of one euro per 1.4453 U.S. dollars. All data is on file with the author.
67 See LVMH MoET HENNESSY-LOUIS VUITTON, ANNUAL REPORT 2010 (2010) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 2010], available at http://wrww.1vmh.com/uploads/assets/Com-fi/Documnents/en/LVMHRA2010_GB.pdf1
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C. Richemont
Richemont is the parent company of several luxury brands, includ-
ing Cartier and Montblanc. Though stock data was only available for
two years, Richemont has consistently outperformed the Dow and S&P
50068:
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also increased by an average of nine percent
68 All available Richemont stock data (FRA:RITB.F) was downloaded from Yahoo Finance,
which is available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=RITB.F+Historical+Prices. After norma-
lizing the first available stock price to $100, the value of Richemont stock on February 21, 2011
was $251.21, or 2.51 times greater than its original value. All data is on file with the author.
69 All available Richemont revenue data was downloaded from Richemont.com, which is
available at http://www.richemont.com/investor-relations/reports/archive.html. Euros were con-
verted to dollars at the April 11, 2011 exchange rate of one euro per 1.4453 U.S. dollars. All data
is on file with the author.
20121
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1149 2011-2012
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
Richemont Revenue ($ billion)
$10
$8
$6
$4-
$2 -
$0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
D. Analysis of These Three Firms
According to the stock and revenue data for Coach, LVMH, and
Richemont, these firms have performed well even despite it being the
most challenging financial times since the Great Depression. Stock
prices have gone up rather remarkably. And revenue for each firm has
gone up when averaged over the last five years. Without the ACTA,
these luxury-status-goods makers are, in their words, "growing" and
"profitable" companies.
If the existence of imitative commodities had a significant negative
effect, one would not expect such bright forecasts for these firms during
a time when imitative commodities are supposedly skyrocketing. If all
status goods were imperiled, as the U.S. government claims 70 and as
many of the signatories to the ACTA have alleged,7' one would not
expect these three firms to be performing so sufficiently.
The ACTA, then, is setting out to cure an ill that does not exist for
these three firms. Their stock prices are not down. Their net sales are
not down. And, most importantly, their revenue is not down. Without
the ACTA, these three firms are performing as well as we might expect.
They are doing a perfectly adequate job of taking care of themselves.
70 Counterfeit Goods: Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Counterfeit Goods
Hearing] (opening statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Secu-
rity and Governmental Affairs) ("According to the U.S. Trade Representative, American busi-
nesses lose as much as $250 billion each year to counterfeiters.").
71 ACTA Final, supra note 20, at 1 ("Noting further that the proliferation of counterfeit and
pirated goods, as well as of services that distribute infringing material, undermines legitimate
trade and sustainable development of the world economy, causes significant financial losses for
right holders and for legitimate businesses, and, in some cases, provides a source of revenue for
organized crime and otherwise poses risks to the public.").
[Vol. 33:31150
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According to these three firms' annual reports, they all are doing
amazingly well.72 For example, they do not complain of depressed sales
due to imitative commodities. In fact, there is no mention of them at all
(as either counterfeit goods or knockoffs). If imitative commodities
present a significant negative effect on these three firms, one would
expect some sort of disclosure in their annual reports. Complaining to
the government that imitative commodities are negative, but failing to
disclose that on one's respective annual report is a violation of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.73 Therefore, either imitative commodi-
ties are truly not such an issue, or these firms have committed securities
fraud in reporting one thing in their annual reports while complaining of
something else to the U.S. government.
Each U.S. corporation must file an annual report. 74 In that annual
report, each corporation must identify issues that may pose "serious
problems"75 for that company. None of the makers of the luxury status
goods discussed here disclosed counterfeit goods, knockoff goods, pi-
rated goods, etc. as a material risk in their annual reports. We must pre-
sume, therefore, that each firm does not recognize imitative commodi-
ties as a serious problem.
At the same time, however, each corporation has complained of
the role of imitative commodities. 76 If imitative commodities are such a
problem as each company says in public, why are they not disclosed in
their annual reports as a material risk? There exists a serious and disin-
genuous disconnect at this crucial point. Luxury-status-goods makers
complain of the deleterious effect of imitative commodities to the U.S.
government. Meanwhile, they boast of their economic successes to
72 Not to be outdone, privately held Prada just announced that 2010 was their most profitable
year yet, with net profits of "250.8 million euros, or $336 million, a 150.4 percent surge com-
pared to 100.2 million euros, or $140.2 million, in the previous year." Luisa Zargani, Prada
Profits Hit Record, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Mar. 29, 2011, at 2, available at
http://www.wwd.com/business-news/prada-profits-hit-record-3566669.
73 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(g)(6)(B)(i) (West 2011) ("Not later than December 31 of each year after
2010, the Investor Advocate shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a
report on the activities of the Investor Advocate during the immediately preceding fiscal year.").
74 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires annual reports to contain "a summary of the
most serious problems encountered by investors during the reporting period." 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78d(g)(6)(B)(ii)(Ill) (West 2011).
75 Id
76 See, e.g., Counterfeit Education, supra note 31 ("Counterfeiting has been linked to orga-
nized crime, child labor, and terrorism. It is estimated that counterfeiting costs the United States
economy 250 to 500 billion dollars a year."); FAQ, Louis VuiTroN, http://www.louisvuitton
.com/front/#/engUS/faq (last visited Jan, 3, 2012) (click on "Questions About Louis Vuitton?"
then "What is Louis Vuitton Doing to Combat Counterfeiting?") ("The fight against counterfeit-
ing is a long-term element in Louis Vuitton's worldwide sustainability strategy. Louis Vuitton
believes that it is essential to preserve the house's ancestral know-how and the work of its
craftsmen by fighting the illegal networks that infringe on human rights, the environment and
global economy,").
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prospective and current investors. In the United States's current eco-
nomic circumstances, it seems extremely problematic to grant these
luxury-status-goods makers federally funded protection in the form of
the ACTA.
If there is no material risk, and firms are merely attempting to con-
vince the governments to perform their intellectual property enforce-
ment for them, then the ACTA acts as another dreaded and hated corpo-
rate bailout.77 Before we make law and policy oriented toward
supplanting private corporate self-policing, we ought to make sure that
imitative commodities really are the problem that they are made out to
be. Claiming one thing in one's annual reports for public consumption
and another thing to the U.S. government for private consumption (be-
tween the government and the corporation) smacks of the duplicitous
conduct that got banks into trouble for dealing in mortgage-backed se-
curities and the like.
If imitative commodities are a significant drain on American cor-
porate wealth, such corporations should be asked to document this with
verifiable data. If it is a major issue, Congress should determine an ap-
propriate response. We, certainly, should not simply believe the conclu-
sions of the CEOs from various companies and sign an executive order
in response to those claimed harms. In this Article, I am really asking
one question: where is the evidence and is it verifiable?
In fact, Levi Strauss & Co. is a very good example of a firm that
has been able to use imitation to its advantage and reverse a downward
trend in the value of their product. Immediately after World War II,
Levi's blue jeans became ubiquitous.78 Levi's denim was desired
worldwide by aspiring youths.79 It became so popular and so desired
that many imitators were boM.80 These imitators had remarkable suc-
77 Cf Philip Zimmerly, The Answer is Blowing in Procedure: States Turn to Medical Criteria
and Inactive Dockets to Better Facilitate Asbestos Litigation, 59 ALA. L. REV. 771, 777 n.54
(2008) ("A corporate bailout, to enrich a few companies at the expense of numerous other com-
panies, is unacceptable as both a business proposition and a matter of public policy." (quoting
The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing on S, 3274 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 85-86 (2006) (testimony of Edmund F. Kelly, President & CEO,
Liberty Mutual Group))).
78 See RACHEL LOUISE SNYDER, FUGITIVE DENIM: A MOVING STORY OF PEOPLE AND
PANTS IN THE BORDERLESS WORLD OF GLOBAL TRADE 141 (2009) ("The real evolution ofjeans
both as a symbol and as a style began during World War I. The grainy black-and-white photo-
graphs by Walker Evans of Depression-era families, unsmiling, with haunted eyes and uniforms
of stained jeans, seemed to suggest something uniquely American, the will to believe in your own
strength and dignity against overwhelming circumstances.").
79 See id. at 142 ("Because they were rare, jeans in Japan could cost upwards of nearly half a
month's salary in the immediate postwar period. Around Tokyo, secondhand markets for sol-
dier's cast-off jeans thrived. Like cars, jeans had become mass-produced, and they suggested
almost endless economic possibility and industry."),
80 Other postwar manufactures included Lee, Wrangler, Pay Day, Tuff Nut, Hercules, Buck-
hide, Union Made, Big Ben, and Carhart. Id,
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cess.8' There was so much success in the blue jean industry that "de-
signer jeans" 82 were born. Today, some designer jeans sell for thou-
sands of dollars a pair.83
Though Levi Strauss was the largest clothing maker in the world in
1977, the company encountered significant financial difficulties in the
early 1980s as the global demand for denim stabilized. 84 But Levi
Strauss did not run to the government and ask for a new law to prevent
copying of their blue jeans. Rather, it engaged in the ancient American
tradition: competition.
Levi Strauss began to imitate the imitators. Today, Levi's is a very
strong brand and Levi Strauss is a healthy firm.85 The company accom-
plished this by raising prices. It began its own stand-alone stores and
started imitating the designer jeans brands.86 Today, some pairs of Le-
vi's jeans retail for as much as $198.87 According to the Guinness Book
of World Records, the most expensive pair of jeans ever sold was a
115-year-old pair of Levi's 501 jeans, sold on eBay in 2005 for
$60,000.88
Levi Strauss learned an important lesson. Imitation is the key to
success. While Levi Strauss also engaged in an aggressive campaign to
take back their brand by enforcing its trademark in the mere stitching
used to sew the rear pockets,89 they also imitated success. The result for
Levi's: success.
81 After World War II, these other brands had become "established manufacturers." See id.
82 Fiorucci's Buffalo 70s "were also enormously successful, and other well-respected design-
ers followed, including Gloria Vanderbilt and Calvin Klein." Id. at 143.
83 In a 2005 article, Forbes Magazine indicated: "While many women-and some men-are
willing to pay as much as $145 without giving it a second thought, increasingly, designer labels
are offering jeans ranging from $300 to as much as $4,000." Susan Yara, The Most Expensive
Jeans, FORBES.COM (Nov. 30, 2005, 12:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2005/l1/29/most-
expensive-jeans-cxsyl 130featlis.html.
84 The company decreased earnings by 25% in 1981, eliminated 2000 jobs in 1982, made a
brief recovery in 1983, and decreased profits by 50% in 1984. 16 INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY
OF COMPANY HISTORIES 327 (Tina Grant ed., St. James Press 1997).
85 "Earnings were $155 million on the average in the 1980s. By 1990, earnings stood at $251,
and the next year increased to $361. The next two years each added a hundred million also, until
by 1995 the company earned over $700 million." Id. at 328.
86 "The flagship store in Manhattan opened across the street from Bloomingdale's in 1993.
Standard 501 jeans there cost $47. Macy's charged $42, and J.C. Penney $29.99." Id
87 Levi's United States website sells 511 Skinny Jeans for $198. See Men's Levi's Jeans,
LEVI'S, http://us.levi.com/family/index.jsp?categoryd=3699943 (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
Levi's Japan website sells several pairs of vintage Levi's jeans for F29,925, or about $367. See
Men's E-Shop, LEVI's, http://www.e-levi.jp/shop/lvc/item/list/category id/341 (last visited Jan.
3, 2012).
88 GUINNESS WORLD RECORDS 2010, at 299 (2009), available at http://www.
guinnessworldrecords.com/records-1/most-expensive-jeans-sold-at-auction-online.
89 The New York Times reports that by 2007, Levi Strauss had filed "nearly 100 [trademark
infringement lawsuits] against its competitors since 2001." Michael Barbaro & Julie Creswell,
With a Trademark in Its Pocket, Levi's Turns to Suing Its Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at
Al.
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Some goods play a larger role for their bearer than simply the
function of carrying their goods, covering their feet or keeping them
warm. Although that is an obvious truism, less obvious is whether and
to what extent governments around the world should become involved
in maintaining the status of these goods. Should this remain a largely
private endeavor, or should we make it more of a public one? If the
ACTA prohibits all or nearly all imitation, it may, at some point, also
hinder competition-precisely the converse of the ACTA's stated ob-
jective.
III. THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT
The ACTA is a marvel in international law.90 There are two ways
to create multilateral agreements. The first, and most common, is to
create a treaty.9' The most important treaty in intellectual property is
the TRIPS Agreement.92 One important part of the TRIPS Agreement is
the requirement that signatory states may create agreements that are
more rigid regarding intellectual property, but not less.93 That is, states
may create more rights than the TRIPS Agreement contemplates, but
not fewer. The ACTA, therefore, is considered a "TRIPS-plus" 94
90 The ACTA has progressed at an alarming pace for an international trade agreement. There
have been eight rounds of talks:
Geneva, Switzerland: June 3-4, 2008;
Washington, D.C.: United States: July 29-31, 2008;
Tokyo, Japan: October 8-9, 2008;
Paris, France: December 15-18, 2008;
Rabat, Morocco: July 16-17, 2009;
Seoul, Korea: November 4-6, 2009;
Guadalajara, Mexico: January 26-29,2010; and
Wellington, New Zealand: April 12-16, 2010.
91 Treaties are most commonly used in the United States because they are explicitly autho-
rized by the Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. Treaties are also the most commonly used
form of agreement internationally. Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in and with International
Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 105,
124 (2003).
92 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
93 See id, at art. 1, 1. These more rigid agreements are called "TRIPS-plus agreements."
Ralph Fischer, The Expansion of Intellectual Property Rights by International Agreement: A
Case Study Comparing Chile and Australia's Bilateral FTA Negotiations with the U.S., 28 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 135 (2006) ("TRIPS-plus provisions define various IPRs or
expand the scope or standard of an IPR beyond the minimal TRIPS standard...."); Maria Julia
Oliva, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity and Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 45, 53 (2003) (defining TRIPS-plus as "standards more extensive than those of the TRIPS
Agreement or that eliminate options existent under the TRIPS Agreement").
94 Emily Ayoob, Note, Recent Development: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 28
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 182 (2010).
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agreement, as it claims to make intellectual property rights stronger
than the TRIPS Agreement requires.
The ACTA is not a treaty, however. Other than by treaty, the other
way to bind the United States to some international agreement is to
create an executive order.95 Other countries have differing laws on this
subject; however, in the United States, an executive order has the force
of law for as long as the President is (or subsequent Presidents are) in-
terested in maintaining that order. 96
Executive orders are usually reserved for times of war or when
there is not sufficient time to go through the democratic process of
creating an international treaty.97 For example, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt signed an executive order to create a lend-lease agreement
with Britain prior to the United States's entry into World War II when
he tried and failed to get Congress to act.98
First President Bush and then President Obama-both apparently
considering the ACTA negotiations and process to be vital to the inter-
ests of the United States-subverted the treaty process and proceeded
directly with an executive order.99 As a result, the usual democratic
process has not been followed throughout the enactment of the AC-
TA. 00 Nowhere in the TRIPS Agreement is there an indication that
states could or should subvert the democratic process when arriving at
TRIPS-plus agreements.
The fact that this has been negotiated as an executive order rather
than a multilateral treaty is not even the worst of the ACTA. The ACTA
95 William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427, 457 n.180 (1995) (citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937) (upholding the president's authority to enter into international agreements without the
consent of Congress)).
96 See id. at 458 (noting that there is "no significant" difference in the domestic application of
a treaty versus a congressional-executive agreement, and that the difference is one of "form and
not substance").
97 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 658 (1981) (reaffirming presidential action
without the consent of Congress where "the settlement of claims has been determined to be a
necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute"); Gordon Silverstein &
John Hanley, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion in Times of War and Crisis, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 1453, 1457, 1483-84 (2010) (highlighting some key historical executive agreements during
times of war or national emergency).
98 See GLEN S. KRUTZ & JEFFREY S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS: INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN A SYSTEM OF SHARED POWERS 6 (2009).
99 See, e.g., Kathy Gill, On Internet Censorship: ACTA and COICA, NEWSVINE.COM (Oct.
12, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://uspolitics.newsvine.com/news/2010/10/12/5279829-on-internet-
censorship-acta-and-coica; David Post, Outrageous Treaty Nonsense, or the Copyright Tail
Wagging the Internet Dog, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 26 2010, 5:11 PM), http://volokh.com/
2010/03/26/outrageous-treaty-nonsense-or-the-copyright-tail-wagging-the-internet-dog.
100 See, e.g., Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 247-50 (2009) ("With no open negotiating
process, and no draft publically available, [the] ACTA is a black box that could contain a
bomb.").
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was developed in extreme secrecy.o'0 Although Wikileaks was able to
leak drafts prior to the Agreement's official release date, the first formal
draft of the ACTA was published on April 21, 2010.102 The final draft
was finally published a mere nine months later by the Commerce De-
partment in December of 2010.103 The only people that were invited to
comment on drafts of the ACTA were members of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative's twenty-eight Industry Trade Advisory Committees,104 and
some of the CEOs and other corporate leaders of the largest corpora-
tions in America. 05
ACTA membership is acquired through what is known as the
"club" principle. 0 6 Multilateral treaties are published to the world and
every country is asked to join.' 0 7 The basic international principle of
equality presupposes every country is considered equal. While Saddam
101 See Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA):
Two Tales ofa Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235, 1236-37 (2009).
102 On April 21, 2010, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative released the first official
draft of the ACTA. See 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 17, at 44.
103 See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), AUSTL. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS & TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.aultrade/acta (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (providing a link
to the final ACTA text, published on December 3, 2010); Monika Ermert, "Final Final" ACTA
Text Published; More Discussions Ahead for EU, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 6, 2010, 10:05
PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/12/06// E2%80%98final-finalE2%80%99-acta-
text-published-more-discussion-ahead-for-eu ("Now the 'final final' text has been published by
several negotiating partners and is open to more interpretation. . . .").
104 Created by Congress in 1974 and managed by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the twenty-eight advisory committees are made up of roughly 700 people and divided by indus-
try. See Advisory Committees, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.
ustr.gov/about-us/intergovernmental-affairs/advisory-committees (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
The committees were created "to ensure that U.S. trade policy and trade negotiating objectives
adequately reflect U.S. public and private sector interests." Id
I05 See James Love, Who Are the Cleared Advisors that Have Access to Secret ACTA Docu-
ments?, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Mar. 13, 2009, 2:44 PM), http://keionline.org/blogs/
2009/03/13/who-are-cleared-advisors (listing various Industry Trade Advisory Committees).
Members of these committees include, among others, the Director of Commercial Trade Policy
from Boeing Company; the Director of International Programs Defense and Space from Honey-
well International; the Vice President of International Programs from GE Aviation; the Manager
of International Strategy and Trade from Ford Motor Company; the Chief Economist of General
Motors Corporation; the Senior Director of International Relations from Medtronic, Inc.; the Vice
President of International Affairs from Johnson & Johnson; the Vice President of Global Opera-
tions from Proctor & Gamble; the Vice President of Industry Relations from Halliburton; the
Director of Global Trade and Competition Policy from Intel Corporation; the Executive Director
of International Affairs from AT & T; the Director of Worldwide Government Affairs and Public
Policy from Levi Strauss & Co.; and the Vice President of Verizon Communications. See Indus-
try Trade Advisory Committees, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., http://www.ita.doc.gov/itac/committees/
index.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
106 See CLAUDIO BRENNI, 3D THREE, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT
(ACTA): A NEW OBSTACLE TO HUMAN RIGHTS? (2010), http://www.3dthree.orgpdf_3D/
201006ACTAlnformationnote.pdf (describing the ACTA as an exclusive club).
107 See D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT'L L.
295,321 (1994).
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Hussein ruled Iraq, Iraq ratified the 1975 Algiers Agreement. 08 No one
objected to Iraq joining the 1975 Algiers Agreement because every
country is considered equal on the international stage.
This is not true of the ACTA. The ACTA is a plurilateral agree-
ment.109 ACTA membership is by invitation only. 0 The ACTA was
actually first proposed by Japan. The United States and then the Euro-
pean Union quickly joined. These countries negotiated the initial
framework of the ACTA.)"1 Conspicuously absent from the list of
members, however, is any developing country, let alone any least-
developed country. That is, at least at first, the ACTA is designed for
and written by the developed world.112 The ACTA is set up as an "us
versus them" proposition. As such, it is inconsistent with the way inter-
national law usually develops. Though the Obama Administration has
committed itself to transparency, the secrecy with which the Adminis-
tration has kept the ACTA is reason for true skepticism as to its real
purpose.
Many organizations have expressed their opposition to the ACTA.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) opposes the ACTA, calling
for a greater public spotlight on the proposed agreement.11 3 The EFF
claims that the goal of the ACTA is to create a "new standard of intel-
lectual property enforcement, above the current internationally-agreed
standards in the TRIPs Agreement," and that the Agreement "raises
considerable concerns for citizens' civil liberties and privacy rights, and
the future of Internet innovation.""14
108 The Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975 "provided for some territorial adjustments,
including the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab waterway's boundary." Efraim Karsh, Military
Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited, 64 INT'L AFF. 83, 86 (1988).
Five years later, "the Iraqi invasion in September 1980 reflected President Saddam Hussein's
ambitions-which ranged from the occupation of Iranian territories (the Shatt al-Arab and Khu-
zestan), through the overthrow of the Khomeini regime, to the desire to assert Iraq as the pre-
eminent Arab and Gulf state." Id. at 83.
109 See, e.g., Lavonne D. Burke, Note, The United States Takes Center Stage in the Interna-
tional Fight Against Online Piracy & Counterfeiting, 33 HOUS, J. INT'L L. 227, 230 (2010);
McManis, supra note 101, at 1236; Peter K. Yu, Copyright USA-A Collection: The Surging
Influence of Copyright Law in American Life, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1373, 1377 (2010). See generally
Howard E. Kass, Note, Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938 US. Aviation Policy into the Jet
Age, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 143, 180 (1994) ("A plurilateral agreement is defined as an
agreement between two nations which other nations can agree to follow.").
110 ROBIN GROSS, IP JUSTICE, IP JUSTICE WHITE PAPER ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) 5 (2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/IPJusticeACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf.
III See Masaaki Kotabe, Evolving Intellectual Property Protection in the World: Promises and
Limitations, l U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 1, 15 (2010).
112 Singh II, supra note 33, at 23 ("The implications of ACTA will be [far-reaching) and
devastating for the third world.").
113 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.
org/issues/acta (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
114 Id
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The Free Software Foundation (FSF) argues that the ACTA will
make it more difficult and expensive to distribute free software via file-
sharing and peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies like BitTorrent, technolo-
gies currently used to distribute large amounts of free software." 5 The
FSF claims that the ACTA "will have a far broader scope, and in par-
ticular, will deal with new tools targeting 'Internet distribution and in-
formation technology.""' 6 The Agreement "increases the chances of
getting your devices taken away" and creates a "culture of surveillance
and suspicion."" 7 Until recently, negotiations for the ACTA were con-
ducted completely behind closed doors. Both the Bush and Obama Ad-
ministrations have rejected requests to make the text of the ACTA pub-
ic.'18 In 2009, Knowledge Ecology International filed a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request, but their request was denied because it
was deemed to be for material "properly classified in the interest of
national security."" 9
A major concern in the United States is the "Border Measures"
proposal of the ACTA. Prior versions of the ACTA seemed to empower
security officials at airports and at international borders to search laptop
computers, handheld MP3 players, and similar electronic devices for
content not paid for by the possessor. Possessors of unpurchased con-
tent would be subject to fines and confiscation of their devices.
In June of 2008, Canadian academic Michael Geist argued that the
government should lift the veil on the ACTA's secrecy.120 Geist argued
that public disclosure "might put an end to fears about iPod searching
border guards"'21 and that "[g]reater transparency would . .. lead to a
more inclusive process," highlighting that the ACTA negotiations have
excluded both civil society groups as well as developing countries.122
A number of civil rights organizations have argued that "the cur-
rent draft of ACTA would profoundly restrict the fundamental rights
and freedoms of European citizens, most notably the freedom of ex-
pression and communication privacy." 23
115 Speak Out Against ACTA, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND. (June 19, 2008, 12:55 PM),
http://www.fsf.org/campaigns/actal.
116 Id
117 Id
118 Protecting national security has been proffered as the reason the ACTA text has been kept
secret. See Ayoob, supra note 94, at 188; McManis, supra note 101, at 1238.
1'9 James Love, White House Says ACTA Text a State Secret: EU Parliament Says Time for
More Transparency, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Mar. 12, 2009, 7:32 PM), http://keionline.
org/blogs/2009/03/12/acta-state-secret
120 Michael Geist, Government Should Lift Veil on ACTA Secrecy, MICHAEL GEIST (June 9,
2008), http://www.michaelgeist.calcontent/view/3013/135/.
121 Id
122 Id
123 E.g., ACTA: A Global Threat to Freedoms (Open Letter), FREE KNOWLEDGE INST.,
http://freeknowledge.eu/acta-a-global-threat-to-freedoms-open-letter (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
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A. Objections
1. The ACTA Is Not Responsive to Imitative Commodities
One of the most obvious objections to the ACTA on a substantive
level is whether and to what extent it would actually influence the im-
portation and sale of imitative commodities. Much like various "Drug
Czars" 24 in the United States that have had no appreciable impact on
the importation and consumption of controlled substances,125 the ACTA
focuses on penalizing the consumption of imitative commodities rather
than addressing the source of their manufacture. This presumes, of
course, that we actually want to stop the manufacture of imitative com-
modities.
Interpol has attempted for some years to interdict the manufacture
of imitative commodities in South America, including through what is
known as "Operation Jupiter." 26 If all of their numbers are to be be-
lieved, however, the first phase of Operation Jupiter resulted in the sei-
zure of $290 million worth of goods.127 That is an impressive amount
until one compares it to the alleged $600 billion worth of sales of imita-
tive commodities worldwide.128 That means that all of Interpol's efforts
and all of their expenditures in South America have netted less than
0.05% of imitative commodities last year. It is unclear from Interpol's
web site whether this $290 million is for one year or the entire life of
the operation. To be sure, the claim that the imitative commodity indus-
try is worth $600 billion is for one year. That is, the amount of imitative
124 According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the term Drug Czar" was first
coined in 1982 by United Press International when it published a report stating that "'Sena-
tors... voted 62-34 to establish a "drug czar" who would have overall responsibility for U.S.
drug policy."' Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,
to Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, Comm. on Gov't Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives (Jan. 4, 2005), available at http://proxychi.baremetal.con/csdp.org/research/
303495.pdf (quoting Letter from Edward H. Jurith, General Counsel, Office of Nat'l Drug Con-
trol Policy, to Susan A. Poling, Managing Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov't Accountability Of-
fice (Sept. 30, 2004)).
125 See generally DAVID P. BROSTROM, THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: A REAL-
ITY CHECK, at iii (1997), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=
ADA326380&Location=-U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ("During the past decade the United States has
steadily increased its efforts to curb drug abuse and drug trafficking.").
126 See generally Press Release, Interpol, Operation Jupiter III-South America (2008), availa-
ble at https://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2008/PR200821background.pdf.
127 Media Release, Interpol, Counterfeiting Networks Across South America Targeted in
Interpol and World Customs Organization Operations (Apr. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2009/PR32.
128 E.g., Zachary A. Pollinger, Counterfeit Goods and Their Potential Financing of Interna-
tional Terrorism, 1 MICH. J. BUS. 85, 86 (2008); About Counterfeiting, INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEIT-
ING COAL., http://www.iacc.org/about-counterfeiting (last visited Mar. 20,2011).
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commodities interdicted by Interpol on an annual basis may be signifi-
cantly less than 0.05%.
By creating the ACTA in such a secretive manner, the creators
have not only failed to investigate whether elimination of imitative
commodities is a desirable outcome, but have also neglected to conduct
research into how to effectively stop or reduce the creation of imitative
commodities. Are there other, more effective ways to eliminate imita-
tive commodities? Some of the more effective terms (though of harsher
constitutional and civil rights relevance) of the ACTA were eliminated
or curtailed in the final rounds of the drafting of the agreement.129
Therefore, although ACTA compliance allows a country to interdict
sales of a commercial nature, it allows countries to exclude application
of the ACTA to private luggage. As a result, a package shipped through
FedEx containing multiple imitative commodities could be seized, but a
person's suitcase containing the same amount of imitative commodities
may not be seized. How long will it be before importers of imitative
commodities learn this detail?
If we want to effectively eliminate the importation of imitative
commodities, more draconian methods may be necessary. However,
groups campaigning against the ACTA have opposed these efforts.130
The creators of the ACTA relinquished harsher border measures and
instead put in place exceptions for personal luggage.
That is, the ACTA might be somewhat responsive to massive
shipments from countries outside of the United States; however, it is
completely unresponsive to imitative commodities produced within the
United States. As such, the ACTA has become a protectionist meas-
ure.13' It allows all signatory states to discriminate against the importa-
tion of imitative commodities, while failing to address domestic imita-
129 See Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) 5 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll, of Law, PIJIP Research Paper No. 17, 2011),
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context
research ("The latest draft of ACTA ... is relatively less draconian than previous incarnations.").
Compare ACTA Final, supra note 20, with ACTA Draft, supra note 20. But see Kaminski, supra,
at 27-29 (claiming the December draft of the ACTA can be considered more extensive due to the
expansion of some definitions since the April draft).
130 See Letter from Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n, Library Copyright Alliance & Net-
Coalition, to Stanford McCoy, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Intellectual Prop. &
Innovation (Jul. 23, 2008), available at http://www.ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/CCIA-
LCA-NetCoalition-ltr-USTR-ACTA-damages.pdf; Stop Canada from Passing ACTA Petition,
PETITION ONLINE, http://www.petitiononline.com/actanono/petition.html (last visited Mar. 21
2011).
131 J. Janewa OseiTutu, A Sui Generis Regime for Traditional Knowledge: The Cultural Di-
vide in Intellectual Property Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 147, 214 (2011) ("Unfortu-
nately, the recent negotiations on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ('ACTA') serve as
yet another example of an expanding protectionist intellectual property model that predominantly
favors industrialized countries' interests.").
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tive-commodity production. 3 2 In effect, the ACTA acts as a border
protection measure, allowing domestic imitative-commodities produc-
ers in each signatory state to prosper, while encouraging the exclusion
of imitative commodities from importation into those same states.
As such, the ACTA is inconsistent with Article 1 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which states: "Members may, but shall not be obliged to,
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by
this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the
provisions of this Agreement." 33 Since the ACTA includes protection-
ist measures to allow participants to except their policies and their laws
from international scrutiny, it acts to contravene the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement. The underlying point of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), of which TRIPS is a part, is to increase the free movement
of goods and services on an international basis. 134 To the extent that the
ACTA interferes with this basic notion, it contravenes the provisions of
the TRIPS Agrecment. Therefore, the ACTA, from the start, is ineffec-
tive in prohibiting the conduct it purports to address.
2. The ACTA Is Policy Laundering
Policy laundering is the act of taking an unpalatable policy posi-
tion and "laundering" it through some international organization that
then presents it back to the domestic law-generating body in the form of
a treaty. 35 Thus, a policy is laundered through the international sphere
to make it more palatable in the domestic sphere. The ACTA takes this
a step further. Rather than taking a controversial or unpalatable position
from the domestic sphere, it presumes opposition to that position and
circumvents the entire domestic legislative sphere.
Since the rhetoric castigating all imitative commodities is so ag-
gressive, it is difficult to predict what response the ACTA would have
elicited if it had been submitted to the normal treaty or legislative
132 See generally Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to Inter-
national Trade?: ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 645
(2011) (discussing the border measures established by the ACTA and their effects on the interna-
tional flow of goods).
133 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 1, 1.
134 Jeffrey Kessler, Book Note, 46 STAN. J. INT'L L. 243, 243 (2010) (reviewing CONTINGENT
PROTECTIONISM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Kyle W. Bagwell et al. eds., 2010)) (noting the
irony in the WTO's stated purpose of facilitating trade liberalization while it accepts treaties
practicing contingent protectionism).
135 See Wendy Seltzer, The Imperfect Is the Enemy of the Good: Anticircumvention Versus
Open User Innovation, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 935 n.l 12 (2010) (citing Ian Hosein, Paper
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association: International Relations
Theories and the Regulation of International Dataflows: Policy Laundering and Other Interna-
tional Policy Dynamics 136 (Mar. 17, 2004)).
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process. It is, of course, possible that either domestic legislation or the
treaty process would have been successful in the United States, at least
in creating some type of obstacle to the importation of imitative com-
modities.
Rather, using a secretive process to which many groups and indi-
viduals have objected, both the domestic sphere and the public interna-
tional-law sphere (treaties) were obviated. That makes the ACTA a
policy-laundering launderer. In other words, the Agreement is insulated
from Congress, public input, and from the international multinational
sphere by avoiding the treaty-making system contemplated by the
TRIPS Agreement regime.
As an executive order, the ACTA becomes law without legislative
involvement, without involvement of truly multilateral public interna-
tional law, and without involvement of the U.S. judiciary. In that sense,
the ACTA operates as an overreach by an administration that had see-
mingly committed itself to transparency.136 One wonders what is so
special about the problem of imitative commodities that would drive a
government to such extremes.
3. The ACTA's Criminal Provisions Are Overbroad or Vague
The ACTA requires signatory states to make it a criminal violation
to import or use trademarks or copyrighted material as an imitative
commodity.' 37 The penalties must be significant,138 or at least signifi-
cant enough to deter people from engaging in imitative-commodity
behavior.139
Although these provisions might be significant for some develop-
ing countries, all countries that are on the initial list of signatory states
are either well-developed or significantly-developed states. There
should be no need, for example, to increase penalties for trademark
infringement in the European Union or Japan. These countries already
have significant bodies of law relating to trademark-infringing activi-
ty.140 By adding criminal provisions to the ACTA and requiring these
countries to follow them, one of two things seems to be occurring.
136 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
137 See ACTA Final, supra note 20, at ch. II, art. 23.
138 See id. Due to the lack of a clear definition in the ACTA's text, this vague standard will
prove difficult to enforce consistently across the member countries.
139 ACTA Final, supra note 20, at ch. H, art. 24 ("[E]ach Party shall provide penalties
that. .. [are] sufficiently high to provide a deterrent to future acts of infringement, consistently
with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.").
140 See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Wei Shi, Globalization and Indigenization: Legal
Transplant of a Universal TRIPS Regime in a Multicultural World, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 455, 475
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The first possible explanation for including criminal provisions is
that we may not be satisfied with the level of enforcement for trademark
infringement in the various member states. As each country has very
well-developed systems of trademark enforcement, this seems spurious.
Do we really want to tell France that it does not enforce its trademark
rights soundly enough, and that we are worried about this level of pro-
tection so much that we need to make France agree to the criminal pro-
visions of the ACTA?
The second possible explanation for including the criminal provi-
sions of the ACTA is that there is something more to be gained from
their inclusion. If every country already has adequate civil enforcement
of trademark protection, the criminal provisions of the ACTA must add
something to this inquiry. That is, ACTA compliance achieves a level
of criminalization of intellectual property that may or may not be possi-
ble if the normal route of legislation in each country were to be fol-
lowed. If it were so important for each country to terminate the conduct
of imitative commodities, it would be better to include the legislatures
of each country, especially in the United States, if we are to expect
compliance as a policy objective.
The United States's influence on the international sphere is at its
lowest point in many years.141 The public international arena is looking
to the United States to lead the world out of an economic downturn, and
away from terrorism and extremism.142 As such, the United States has
an increased burden not to dictate. When the United States appears to
be dictating, the rest of the world merely tunes it out. 143 If we want to
lead the world away from imitative commodities, we need to lead by
example.
(2010) (dating Japanese trademark law back to the early seventeenth century and the feudal
regime of Edo Bakufu).
141 See GALLUP, INC. & MERIDIAN INT'L CTR., THE U.S.-GLOBAL LEADERSHIP PROJECT 14,
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/File/146561/USGlobalLeadership WPCONS_02-
11_cc.pdf ("The list of countries where approval of U.S. leadership dropped substantially in 2010
is nearly four times longer than the list of countries with sizable gains. It also represents every
major global region and includes major nations.").
142 Julia Kollewe, Hopes Rise for US Economic Recovery, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Jan. 28, 2011,
14:51 GMT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/201 I/jan/28/us-economic-recovery-hopes
("The US is expected to be one of the fastest growing developed countries in 2011, largely re-
flecting the contrast of the ongoing stimulus with other countries, such as the UK and other
heavily indebted European nations, where austerity measures designed to reduce deficits are
stifling domestic demand." (quoting Chris Williamson, chief economist at research firm Markit in
London) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143 "Nation-building" by the United States has been widely criticized and largely unsuccessful,
as "most of the countries where the United States intervened militarily either failed to democrat-
ize or became more authoritarian within the decade of the end of the American intervention." See
Minxin Pei et al., Op-Ed, Why Nation-Building Fails in Mid-Course; After US. Intervention,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar, 17, 2004, at 6.
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It may be counterproductive to use an executive order to make the
importation of goods that are deemed to be of a commercial nature for
purposes of the ACTA into a criminal event that requires harsh criminal
penalties commensurate with equal crimes.144 Rather, it might be more
effective to lead by example and have an open, transparent discussion
of the ills of imitative commodities. Maybe, as is suggested here, there
are positive ramifications for some level of imitative commodities.
Without a debate about this, we will never know. Societies around the
world should then judge if imitative commodities are so horrible as to
warrant harsh penalties and strict enforcement. If not, it just looks as
though the United States is dictating once again.
Furthermore, the ACTA is said to provide "teeth" to the TRIPS
Agreement.14 5 However, the TRIPS Agreement is said to provide teeth
to the enforcement of intellectual property-law treaties.146 Therefore,
the statement that the ACTA gives the TRIPS Agreement teeth implicit-
ly concludes that the TRIPS Agreement has been a failure.147 If the
TRIPS Agreement still needs teeth to be effective, it seems that there is
something wrong with TRIPS as it was billed as providing the enforce-
ment capacity that the various then-existing treaties lacked.148 This, of
course, raises the point: where is the TRIPS Agreement in this imita-
tive-commodity issue? Prior to making a TRIPS-plus agreement, it is
incumbent upon its advocates to articulate precisely how and why the
TRIPS Agreement is inadequate to respond to the claims of inappro-
priate importation and exportation of imitative commodities. That, too,
seems to be absent from the public discussion of the ACTA.
144 ACTA Final, supra note 20, at ch. 11, art. 24 ("[Parties to the ACTA] shall provide penal-
ties that include imprisonment as well as monetary fines sufficiently high to provide a deterrent to
future acts of infringement, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corres-
ponding gravity.").
145 See Ayoob, supra note 94, at 182-83 ("[T]he USTR has indicated that one reason for
ACTA has been a general desire for certain countries to regulate beyond TRIPS' minimum stan-
dards.").
146 J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW § 12.20, at 600 (3d ed. 2008); see also Peter
K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 982-84
(2009).
147 See Cliff Sosnow & Alison Hopkins, Impact of ACTA on Chinese-Canadian Trade,
BLAKEs (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.blakes.com/english/view.asp?ID=4576 ("From the view of
the ACTA negotiating countries, the impetus for the negotiation of ACTA stems from unsuccess-
ful efforts to have enforcement discussions considered at the TRIPS Council meetings.").
148 See Irene Ribeiro Dubowy, Subsidies Code, TRIPS Agreement, and Technological Devel-
opment: Some Considerations for Developing Countries, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 33, 35 n.8 (2003)
("[T]he TRIPS Agreement in a single body of law with wide membership, introduced greater
harmonization, and mostly important, mechanisms of enforcement for the rights granted
than ... previous treaties."); Miaoran Li, Comments, The Pirate Party and the Pirate Bay: How
the Pirate Bay Influences Sweden and International Copyright Relations, 21 PACE INT'L L. REV.
281, 293-94 (2009) ("[T]he TRIPS agreement prescribes detailed procedures for the enforcement
of copyright infringement.").
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4. The ACTA's Border Measures Are Misdirected
The border measures of the ACTA are both vague and frightening
to a free society. Although the final draft of the ACTA has reduced the
initial severity of these measures, the ACTA still applies to "small con-
signments"14 9 of goods that are of a commercial nature. Rather than
prohibiting the provisions of the ACTA from applying to personal lug-
gage, the ACTA states that "[plarties may exclude from the application
of this Section small quantities of goods of a non-commercial nature
contained in travellers' personal luggage." 50 The ACTA still allows
countries to apply the criminal provisions of the ACTA to personal lug-
gage. That is, while prior leaked versions of the ACTA appear to have
required the application of the ACTA to personal luggage, the final
version allows the application to personal luggage. 51
It is not precisely clear what the ACTA does that the U.S. Customs
Service does not already do. Customs currently interdicts commercial
shipments of infringing goods. 152 To enable Customs to prevent a ship-
ment into the United States of infringing goods, a right holder must file
an application to record its trademark, trade name, or copyright with
Customs. 53 It appears that this is precisely what Article 2.X of the AC-
TA contemplates.154
Furthermore, the Lanham Act already has provisions addressing
counterfeit marks.155 In fact, they are rather harsh. A trademark holder
who claims its mark has been used on counterfeit goods can elect statu-
tory damages in the amount of $1000 to $200,000 per counterfeit mark,
per type of good.'5 6 If a court finds that use of the counterfeit mark was
willful, the court could increase this award up to $2,000,000 per mark,
per type of product sold.157 That is, there are already very strict finan-
cial penalties in the United States for trading in counterfeit goods.15
149 ACTA Final, supra note 20, at ch. II, art. 14, 11.
150 Id. at ch. II, ai. 14, 12.
151 Id
152 In 2010, Customs confiscated $188.1 million worth of infringing merchandise in 19,959
seizures, of which $187,9 million and 18,544 seizures were commercial in nature. U.S. CUSToMs
& BORDER PROT., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: FISCAL YEAR 2010 SEIZURE STATIS-
TICS-FINAL REPORT 18-19 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/
110316washington.pdf.
153 19 CF.R. §§ 133.1-133.7 (2011).
154 ACTA Final, supra note 20, at ch. II.
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006).
156 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1) (2006).
157 See id. § 11 17(c)(2).
158 See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09-8458, 2010 WL 308303, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010); see also Coach, Inc. v. Reggae Hot Spot, Inc., No. 10-4902, 2010 WL
5536521 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2010).
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It appears that the ACTA harmonizes customs activities of the var-
ious member states to the United States's standard. This harmonization
happens with no input from legislatures and through no treaty process.
As the United States and Japan were the initial countries to pursue the
ACTA, it appears that the other thirty-five signatory States are harmo-
nizing their customs laws to the United States and Japanese standards.
Whether or not this should happen is an issue of public concern in
which every democratic citizen should have a voice.
5. The ACTA Will Raise Search Costs
The primary function of the very trademarks the ACTA is attempt-
ing to protect is to decrease or maintain search costs.159 Strong trade-
marks reduce search costs because consumers have to think less about
making a purchase.160 Strong trademarks act as shortcuts to the product
or service. 16 1 McDonald's for hamburgers is ubiquitous. No one needs
to think about the nature of the goods provided at McDonald's. Love
them or hate them, McDonald's provides a low-quality, low-priced
meal. It does this worldwide. When a purchaser is confronted with the
McDonald's sign, there is no confusion as to what he or she will get.
The ACTA changes this analysis in significant ways. The ACTA
not only shifts the burden of source recognition from the producer to the
consumer, 162 it criminalizes nonrecognition.163 Therefore, a person who
goes through Tokyo customs might be too tired to carry their extra
purse. It turns out that this extra purse is an imitative commodity of
Prada. If searched, regardless of probable cause,'6 and the bag is de-
termined not to be a genuine Prada bag, the person's baggage is not
only excludable under the ACTA, but also the act of attempting to im-
port an imitation Prada bag is criminal conduct.165
159 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEx. L. REv. 507, 517 (2008); Daniel Devoe, Note, Applying Liability Rules to
Metatag Cases and Other Instances of Trademark Infringement on the Internet: How to Get to
"No Harm, No Foul, " 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1221, 1236 (2010).
160 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987); see also Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World ofInternational
Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998).
161 See Landes & Posner, supra note 160, at 269.
162 This is a byproduct of criminalizing the possession of counterfeit goods. See generally
ACTA Final, supra note 20, at ch. II, art. 23.
163 See id. at ch. 2 art. 23. But see id at ch. II, art. 14.2.
164 See Gennady Stolyarov 11, ACTA: The War on Progress, Freedom, and Human Civiliza-
tion, LUDWIG VON MISES INSTITUTE (Aug. 3, 2010), http://mises.org/daily/4593.
165 See ACTA Final, supra note 20, at ch. II, art. 23. But see id, at ch. 11, art. 14, 1 2.
1166 [Vol. 33:3
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1166 2011-2012
A CASE AGAINST THE ACTA
When the ACTA makes the accidental importation of imitation
Prada merchandise criminal,166 it changes the inquiry from who made
the good to who is carrying the good. When that happens, everyone
naturally will attempt to avoid criminal prosecution. In order to avoid
criminal prosecution, purchasers of imitation Prada bags will need to
take steps to assure that they are not carrying an imitation, but are carry-
ing a genuine good.
That is, purchasers will not be able to rely merely on the trademark
itself. In order to avoid criminal prosecution, purchasers will have to
educate themselves on the difference between a genuine Prada bag and
an imitation Prada bag. As makers of imitative commodities improve
their ability to imitate genuine goods, this becomes more difficult. If the
ACTA is to criminalize the mere possession of imitative commodities,
the very nature of the search-cost equation of trademarks will change.
From the manufacturers' point of view, at first this may seem posi-
tive. Requiring that purchasers make informed choices and avoid imita-
tive commodities is important. However, that is precisely the purpose of
private trademark law. Criminalizing the possession of unknown imita-
tive commodities simply goes too far. It will result in increased search
costs as consumers stop relying on the trademark alone to make pur-
chases.167 As such, the ACTA will have the unintended consequence of
changing an age-old cost-benefit equation, allowing manufacturers to
exclude others from using certain signs on or in connection with the
sale of their goods, to a regime of strict enforcement against individuals
who may possess imitative commodities, thereby destroying trust in the
very trademarks that the ACTA intends to protect.
6. The Existing Data Does Not Support the ACTA
There are many claims as to the value of imitative commodities in
the world. All numbers are simply unreliable.168 Interpol puts the total
value of worldwide imitative commodities at $600 billion.' 69 Trade
166 See supra note 165.
167 Cf Landes & Posner, supra note 160, at 269-70 (noting that consumers, after having a
positive experience with a trademarked product, will purchase products based on that trademark
alone and consequently reduce their search costs).
168 See, e.g., Pollinger, supra note 128, at 98 (citing Felix Salmon, Thompson 's Counterfeit
Numbers, Op-Ed, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 2, 2004, at 11) (criticizing the unrealistic statistics proffered by
the New York City Comptroller as "an attempt to pander to influential lobbying forces"); Susan
Scafidi, The Cost of Counterfeits? GAO Doesn't Know, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://counterfeitchic.com/2010/04/the-cost-of-counterfeits-gao-doesnt-know.html ("[A] major
part of the problem is that experts can't agree on a methodology for evaluating the various
harms-and even potential offsetting benefits-attributable to counterfeit goods.").
169 See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, THE GLOBAL IP UPWARD RATCHET, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
AND PIRACY ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS: THE STATE OF PLAY (2008), available at http://www
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groups claim counterfeits cost "millions of lost jobs and dollars[.]"o70 A
2007 study indicated that the United States loses $58 billion each year,
in addition to 373,375 jobs.17' Havoscope, a self-professed "premier
global information provider of black market activities," claims that the
value of global trade in counterfeit goods is $585.38 billion.172 Only
one thing seems for certain: no one really knows for sure.
There are several questions entities fail to answer when they state
the amount of imitative commodities. First, of course, is what "value"
really means. Is it the value of the goods as produced to the producer of
imitative commodities? Is it the value of the goods once sold to whole-
salers of imitative commodities? Is it the value of the imitative com-
modities on the street as retailers attempt to sell these goods? Or is it the
value of genuine goods, presuming there is a one-for-one exchange
between genuine goods and imitative commodities? This issue is never
made clear in these fantastic claims about the size of the imitative-
commodity market.
To be clear, I am not arguing that the value of the imitative-
commodity market is zero. However, if we are to make significant
changes to international policy based on the size of this market, we
ought to have better data than that which currently exists, or data that
exists and is shared with the public.
To obtain accurate data on the value of imitative commodities, one
would have to employ a team of appraisers who would go to the source
of the production of the imitative commodities. 7 3 As they roll off the
.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual property/development.research/SusanSellfinalversion.pdf
(noting that the Business Coalition to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy values imitative commodi-
ties at $600 billion); Laurie J. Flynn, US. Discloses Moves to Stop Piracy of Intellectual Proper-
ty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at C7; Josh Goodman, Smuggler's Delight, GOVERNING MAGA-
ZINE, Aug. 2006, at 48m ("The World Customs Organization and Interpol estimate that $600
billion in counterfeit merchandise went to market last year-much of it made in China-and U.S.
businesses alone lost $250 billion because of the practice."). Since Interpol released this number
in 2004, there has been no documentation of any agency, organization, or person attaching a solid
number to the total global value of the counterfeit industry. This is no doubt due to the lack of
reliable data on which to base such a statistic.
170 E.g., Press Release, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., Senate Judiciary Committee Ap-
proves Bill to Crack Down on Digital Theft by Rogue Websites (Nov. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.mpaa.org/resources/2c78c9d6-la5b-4be5-9735-la4519d98647.pdf (providing Bob
Pisano's statement, in his capacity as President and Interim CEO of the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America).
171 Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the US. Economy, INST.
FOR POLICY INNOVATION (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.ipi.org/IPI/IPIPublications.nsf/
PublicationLookupFullText/23F5FF3E9D8AA79786257369005BOC79.
172 See Counterfeit Goods Ranking, HAVOCSCOPE, http://www.havocscope.com/black-
market/counterfeit-goods/counterfeit-goods-ranking/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
173 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND
PIRATED GOODS 17 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0423.pdf ("There are
several measures of value that can be used, such as the production cost, the domestic value, or the
manufacturer's suggested retail price.").
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assembly line, the appraiser would judge the "value" of the good. To
determine "value," we would have to agree on the moment within the
life cycle of an imitative commodity at which we would be assigning
value and be consistent in this assignment perpetually and worldwide.
Is it in the beginning, end, or middle? The "value" at each point, of
course, will change significantly. Moreover, we would have to do this
on a consistent basis worldwide. That is, it seems impossible to obtain
verifiable data to support any conclusion about the true amount of im-
itative commodities at play at any given time throughout the world.
Therefore, this data-based argument is extremely prone to manipulation.
Before we make major international policy decisions based on the
motivation to erase imitative commodities, we should have solid data as
to the value of those imitative commodities. Without solid data, we are
assuming that taking some action is better than taking no action at all.174
However, there is no data to support that conclusion. It may very well
be that taking no action at all (i.e., not adopting the ACTA) is better
than adopting it. Other than looking at how the ACTA will affect three
producers of legitimate goods,s7 5 I have no support for concluding it
will produce some unintended consequence; however, the supporters of
the ACTA only have statistically unreliable data to conclude that it will
have a positive effect.
Before making significant, international, game-changing policy
decisions on the effect of imitative commodities, we ought to be sure
about the numbers.
B. Link to Terrorism Overstated
Although there seems to be some connection between terrorism
and the manufacture of imitative commodities, the significance of that
connection is as overstated as the raw data of imitative commodities. It
is so overstated that the U.S. government has labeled the ACTA a state
secret.176 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has apparently
established to its satisfaction that the primary source of funding for the
group that carried out the plot in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
was a small t-shirt shop on Fifth Avenue in New York City that sold
174 Because "the net effect [of counterfeiting] cannot be determined with any certainty," any
action to combat counterfeiting must be predicated on the assumption that affirmatively combat-
ing counterfeiting is financially or socially more beneficial than inaction. See id. at 28.
175 See supra Part II.
176 See James Love, Obama Administration Rules Texs of New IPR Agreement Are State
Secrets, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2009, 5:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-
love/obama-administration-rule b_174450html.
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counterfeit or knockoff shirts.' 77 However, nowhere in the relevant FBI
report are actual numbers used.178 This story, stated by the otherwise
infallible FBI or not, seems to be too fantastic to be accurate.
Objectively, one t-shirt vendor on Fifth Avenue would not have
the volume of sales that would be required to raise the millions of dol-
lars needed to carry out that plot. Apparently, this vendor was a contri-
butor to the fund that was used to attack the World Trade Center in
1993. Even if that part were true, nowhere in the FBI report does it say
that it was the exclusive funder of the attack. Nowhere does it say how
much money it took or how much money was raised. The FBI merely
makes the fantastical claim that this t-shirt vendor, selling nongenuine
shirts, contributed some unspecified amount to the effort.
Commentators conclude that all imitative commodities in the
world support terrorism, or more specifically, that buying an imitative
commodity is supporting Al Qaeda. There is no real evidence that this
is true.' 79
Professor Charles McManis from Washington University espoused
the most convincing argument. He described how Interpol is engaged in
a multiyear, multijurisdictional effort in South America to interdict the
production of imitative commodities. Professor McManis has very ex-
haustively described Operation Jupiter-Interpol's effort in South
America to stop the flow of imitative commodities.' 80
However, even Professor McManis's sources for this exhaustive
study are predicated upon two statements: first, a report submitted to
Congress by Ronald K. Noble, the Secretary General of Interpol,' 8 ' and
second, a hearing involving four senators testifying before Congress.18 2
I am not impugning either source, and Professor McManis was right to
rely on these sources. However, these are only two, unverified sources.
Many people make claims to Congress. This does not make them nor-
matively true statements.
177 See, e.g., Dana Thomas, Terror's Purse Strings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at A23 (citing
the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition).
178 Cf Dean T. Olson, Financing Terror, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Feb. 2007, at 1, 3,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2007-pdfs/
feb07leb.pdf (identifying counterfeit goods as a source of funds for the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, but offering no specific amounts in reference to that specific event).
179 See Pollinger, supra note 128, at 98 ("Ultimately, very little is certain in assessing the
magnitude of the counterfeiting industry and the proposed connection between the industry and
international terrorism."); Singh II, supra note 33, at 21 ("The [GAO] study also reveals that the
online film piracy, one of the targets of ACTA's internet chapter has no apparent connection to
organized crime or terrorism.").
180 See McManis, supra note 101.
181 The Links Between Intellectual Property Crime and Terrorist Financing: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 56-61 (2004) (report submitted by Secretary
General of Interpol Ronald K. Noble).
182 Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 70, at 1-7 (statements of Sens. Susan M. Collins,
Joseph I. Lieberman, Daniel I. Akaka, and Frank Lautenberg).
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Academic scholarship 8 3 and popular medial 84 consider these two
sources as verified when they are not. To compound the problems, it
appears that the Obama Administration, as well, takes these statements
at face value. Based on these two statements, not only is there policy
laundering happening where the public process is subverted to enact the
ACTA, but the Administration also feels it necessary to commit the
ACTA to absolute secrecy.
Americans should demand substantial, verified data regarding the
significance of this problem before we commit ourselves to major poli-
cy changes in how we deal with or approach imitative commodities.
Two entities' testimonies to Congress should not be enough to conclude
that there is a significant link between imitative commodities and terror-
ism. Short of having verifiable data, it appears that the Administration
is failing on another front: using fear as a weapon to attain its goals.
This is also something the Obama Administration claimed it would not
do.185
IV. THE BENEFIT OF IMITATIVE COMMODITIES
There are many benefits that luxury-status-goods makers should
realize. The benefits listed below may apply to other goods in other
categories of imitative commodities as well. I leave that question open
for further study.
A. Amorphous Price Point
Some argue that the reason why status goods can maintain and
command a high price is because of the existence of imitative commod-
183 See, e.g., Laura C. Nastase, Made in China: How Chinese Counterfeits are Creating a
National Security Nightmare for the United States, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 143, 153-55 (2008) (reporting that Lieberman "cited an unclassified FBI document which
revealed that Hezbollah used the sale of counterfeit goods to raise cash in the United States")
("Interpol has confirmed that the worldwide counterfeit trade has become a low-cost, high-return
enterprise favored by terrorist organizations such as Hezbolla [sic]." (citing Ronald K. Noble's
Interpol testimony)).
184 See, e.g., David Johnston, Threats and Responses: The Money Trail; Fake Goods Support
Terrorism, Interpol Official Is to Testify, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at Al 1 (noting Secretary
General of Interpol Ronald K. Noble's testimony that the "link between organized crime groups
and counterfeit goods is well established").
185 Quoting President John F. Kennedy, Obama has stated, "[W]e should never negotiate out
of fear, but [we] should never fear to negotiate." Robert Justin Lipkin, The Obama Phenomenon:
Deliberative Conversationalism & the Pursuit Of Community Through Presidential Politics, 12
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 169, 197 (2009) (second alteration in original).
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ities.' 8 6 Without imitative commodities, it would become impossible to
maintain high price points for some goods. 87 It is the existence of im-
itative commodities that props up the price of status goods.
Some economists even believe that entry into a market of imitative
commodities can actually increase the price point for some goods.' 88 Yi
Qian, an associate professor at Northwestern University's Kellogg
School of Management, studied how the entry of imitative-commodities
producers into the market impacted Chinese footwear companies.'89
Qian found that prior to the entry of imitative shoe producers, the ad-
justed price of a high-end authentic shoe was forty-three dollars. After
the entry of imitative-shoe producers, the price went up to sixty-one
dollars.190 Overall, the price rose nearly forty-five percent after the in-
troduction of imitative commodities to the market. Qian reasoned that
the entry of imitative commodities supported the authentic shoe manu-
facturer when people became aware of the substantial difference in ma-
terial used between the authentic shoe and the imitative shoe.' 9 '
So it is with the luxury status goods that are the subject of this
study. As imitative commodities enter the market, they have a positive
effect on the price points that luxury status goods can command, not a
negative one. 192 Imitative commodities have apparently been increa-
singly prevalent in recent years.' 93 During this increased role of imita-
tive commodities, the luxury-status-goods makers' stock prices rose an
average of 181%194 and their net profits rose an average of eighteen
percent.195 If imitative commodities are either as prevalent or in as large
of a quantity as is claimed, one would expect a different effect on the
luxury-status-goods makers. A lack of evidence for any such effect
186 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Con-
sumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1399 (2005)
("Status is by definition a relative concept (A occupies a higher or lower position than B). Fa-
shion goods therefore derive their status premium by reference to goods of lower status.").
187 See id. at 1399-1403.
188 Id at 1402 ("To the extent that counterfeits increase the status benefits conferred by visibly
using the original version of the relevant luxury good, the introduction of counterfeits should
increase the profit-maximizing price that producers of the original can demand...." (using the
term counterfeit in this context to describe products that are "obvious imitations")); see also
Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 36, at 68.
189 See Yi Qian, Impacts ofEntry by Counterfeiters, 123 Q.J. EcON. 1577 (2008).
190 Id. at 1588.
191 See id. at 1599 ("[A]uthentic companies upgraded quality dimensions that could most
directly distinguish their products from those of counterfeiters.").
192 Of course, the dark side of this story, see supra note 1, notwithstanding.
193 See The Truth About Counterfeiting, supra note 8 (stating that counterfeiting has grown
over 10,000 percent in the past two decades). But see Part III.A.6 (noting the lack of empirically-
supported or rationally-calculated statistics to explain the impact of counterfeit goods on busi-
nesses).
194 Stock prices for Coach, LVMH, and Richemont are on file with author.
195 Revenues for available years for Coach (2001-2010), LVMH (2003-2010), and Richemont
(2004-2010) are on file with author.
1172 [Vol. 33:3
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1172 2011-2012
A CASE AGAINST THE ACTA
indicates that either the claim of imitative commodities being all bad is
wrong, the data is wrong, or merely our understanding of the role imita-
tive commodities play is wrong. One way or the other, before interna-
tional policy is set in the form of an executive order, we ought to know
the answers to these questions.
B. Effect on Price Reductions
When manufacturers compete, the prime goal is market share. 196
When economies cycle through good times and bad, firms survive
based on the share of the market that they each command.' 97 When
economic times improve, the successful firm improves exponentially
because it fills a market share, not a specific sales volume. 98
Obtaining market share is, of course, the challenge. Most manufac-
turers must compete in harsh business climates for market share. Invari-
ably, they compete by having sales. 199 That is, they charge significantly
less for a good in order to encourage customers to educate themselves
about the producer, its products, and its quality. 200 Once market share
has been established, the firm increases prices, but not to a degree or at
a rate that causes a steep reduction in market share. 201 If a large market
share is obtained, a slight reduction in market share can accompany a
price increase if the price increases enough to overcome the loss in
market share.202
However, luxury status goods never go on sale and they maintain a
very healthy market share. These types of goods violate the basic rule
of market-share procurement. The reason for this apparent violation is
that the makers of the luxury status goods do not recognize a need to
196 This is likely due to the strong correlation between market share and profitability. See
Robert D. Buzzell et al., Market Share-A Key to Profitability, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1975, at 97, 98 (discussing empirical data collected from fifty-seven companies, and analyzing
business profitability factors); see also David M. Szymanski et al., An Analysis of the Market
Share-Profitability Relationship, . MARKETING, July 1993, at I (discussing, with a more critical
tone, empirical studies documenting a correlation between market share and business profitabili-
ty).
197 Buzzell et al., supra note 196, at 99-102.
198 See generally Robert D. Buzzell & Frederik D. Wiersema, Modelling Changes in Market
Share: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 2 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 27 (1981) (modeling market-share
changes with respect to changes in market variables).
199 TOM GORMAN, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO MBA BASICS 157 (2d ed. 2003)
("Companies are driven to sell because ultimately all their money comes from sales.").
200 Cf Eyal Biyalogorsky & Eitan Gerstner, Contingent Pricing to Reduce Price Risks, 23
MARKETING SCI. 146 (2004) (concluding that the optimal pricing structure for a product is de-
pendent on the consumer's risk attitude).
201 There are four strategies for market share management: "(1) share building, (2) share
maintenance, (3) share reduction, and (4) risk reduction." Paul N. Bloom & Philip Kotler, Strate-
gies for High Market-Share Companies, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1975, at 63, 67-72.
202 See id at 68.
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put their goods on sale. The market-share procurement cycle happens
through imitative commodities. Imitative commodities occupy the low
end of the price-competition cycle.203 The makers of the luxury status
goods do not need to lower prices to compete for market share in the
lower price ranges because imitative commodities play that role for
them.204
C. Advertising Function
The existence of imitative commodities also plays the role of giv-
ing free advertising to the makers of the luxury status goods. 205 Some-
times imitative commodities are recognizable as such; sometimes they
are not.
One study ranked all status-goods purchasers into four categories
based on their status and wealth. 206 Based on a given consumer's status-
wealth category, the study predicted what level of luxury product the
consumer would purchase.207 Then each luxury product was assigned
an average loudness rating.208 Typically the lower the need for status
(and typically the higher the wealth of the consumer), the lower the
loudness rating of a desired luxury product. 209 The poorer you are, the
more you need status, and therefore the louder you want your luxury
item to be. Fully aware of this phenomenon, luxury goods companies
make the louder luxury goods cheaper and therefore more accessible to
the target market for that product, and the quieter products more expen-
203 See Barnett, supra note 186, at 1399-1400, 1415.
204 See id.
205 See Erika Myers, Justice in Fashion: Cheap Chic and the Intellectual Property Equili-
brium in the United Kingdom and the United States, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 47, 54 (2009).
206 Young Jee Han et al., Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role ofBrand Prominence,
J. MARKETING, July 2010, at 15, 17-18 (2010) (dividing purchasers into the categories of the
"patricians," having more wealth and less need for status, the "parvenus," having more wealth
and more need for status, the "proletarians," having less wealth and less need for status, and the
"poseurs," having less wealth and more need for status).
207 Id. at 19 ("If our premise is correct, we expect to observe a quieter, more subtle brand
identification on the more expensive products and a louder, more conspicuous brand identifica-
tion on the relatively less expensive products. Thus, we predict a negative correlation between
price and brand prominence-the extent to which the product advertises the brand by displaying
the mark in a more visible or conspicuous manner (e.g., larger logos, repeat prints). We hypothes-
ize that for luxury goods, on average, as the price goes up, brand prominence goes down.").
208 In the study, three judges gave each handbag a loudness rating on a seven-point scale
where "1" was the quietest and "7" was the loudest. To make the loudness determination, judges
considered two questions: "1. How prominently does this bag display its trademark? (A trade-
mark is a distinctive name, symbol, motto, or emblem that identifies a product, service, or firm.)
2. To what extent would this bag be recognizable as a Gucci (LV) product?" The more affirma-
tive or positive the responses, the higher the loudness rating the judge would give. Id at 19-20.
209 Id. at 20.
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sive. 210 It follows then that what are most often knocked off are the
louder, lower-priced items, because people who buy knockoffs are
looking for a deal on an authentic-looking product and therefore want it
to be seen.2 11
Loud imitative commodities advertise for the status-goods makers.
Status-goods makers benefit because this is free advertising. In fact, it is
precisely targeted advertising, as only the people who want to or do buy
the product recognize the bearer of the imitative commodity.
D. Goodwill of Status Goods Is Improved by
Counterfeit Goods
Goodwill in trademark law has always been a rather amorphous
concept to define. 212 Its role in imitative commodities is also counterin-
tuitive. Firms gain or lose goodwill in odd ways. Many times, a firm's
goodwill is not entirely under its control. 213 So it is with imitative
commodities. A firm's goodwill is closely pegged to whether it is worth
imitating. There are three forms of goodwill: (1) brand goodwill, (2)
firm goodwill, and (3) inherent goodwill.214
Brand goodwill is the most limited concept of goodwill. It implies
a direct knowledge of the product being sold and who manufactures that
good. An example of brand goodwill is a consumer who chooses to buy
a Diet Coke because he is familiar with the company and he likes the
product. This brand goodwill is appropriated only by direct confusion,
where the defendant makes sales in a confusing manner, convincing the
plaintiffs purchasers that it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, attempt-
ing to make the sale. 215
Firm goodwill implicates the corporation itself and transcends any
knowledge of or information about a particular brand or product. How-
ever, many people extend the positive feeling they have for one particu-
lar brand to all products manufactured by one, consistent firm. For a
plaintiff to bring an actionable claim, a defendant corporation needs to
210 See id.
211 Id. at 22 ("[T]he handbags counterfeiters choose to copy are the loud ones....").
212 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REv. 547, 583-84 (2006) ("Some judges and commentators defined
goodwill probabilistically, as the tendency or likelihood that a consumer would return to the same
product or firm and make repeat purchases.... Another approach ... defined goodwill in terms
of favorable mental states.... Yet another definition simply equated goodwill with the value of a
business above and beyond its tangible assets.").
213 See id at 589 ("Retailers could build goodwill by their direct dealings with customers, but
importers, manufacturers, and other agents more remote in the distribution chain had to rely
almost exclusively on marks.").
214 See id. at 551.
215 See id
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sell or market a good or service in a way that implicates sponsorship or
authorization. 2 16
Inherent goodwill is critical to the notion of imitative commodities.
That is, people come to believe that there is something inherently posi-
tive in carrying a Prada accessory. Because of the existence of imitative
commodities, we know that there are many consumers who simply do
not care that the bag they carry is not actually manufactured by Prada.
They carry it, nevertheless.217
Related to inherent goodwill, brands themselves have come to ex-
press consumer identity or philosophy. 218 Branding offers an interesting
way for people to express themselves, and this expression relates to the
inherent goodwill of a firm.219 When a handbag costs ten dollars at Tar-
get, what is accomplished by an individual spending $1000 or more for
the same functional article at Louis Vuitton? What is accomplished, of
course, is that the purchaser signals to others on the street a certain sta-
tus.220 The purchaser of the ten-dollar Target bag signals a different
status. When this happens, brands themselves become "socially-
embedded institutions." 221
By merely glancing at a person on the street, we can place the per-
son in specific categories, much like sumptuary codes from long ago. 222
As Barton Beebe has pointed out, intellectual property today acts much
like sumptuary codes of the distant past. 223 "Haves" and "have-nots" are
identified, not by whether they alone can wear gold, like the sumptuary
codes allowed, but whether or not one produces or consumes intellec-
tual property. 224 The very same thing can be said about status goods.
216 See id at 551-52.
217 See id at 552, 598, 608.
218 How many times have brands suffered in the marketplace when it was determined that a
product was made for slave wages in Central America? Or how many times do manufacturers
signal their superiority by saying they sell only coffee grown in ethical ways farmed by people in
ethical manners? The manner in which the good was made has no real effect on the goodwill of
the firm; however, the perception of ethical treatment of persons or animals has a significant
impact on inherent goodwill.
219 See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REv. 795 (2010).
220 Of course, there are many and various other factors to the status-good equation. These
factors are network effects, signaling effects, bandwagon effects, herding effects, and standard-
setting effects. However, these factors are all beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 49.
221 See Rende R. Gosline, Rethinking Brand Contamination: How Consumers Maintain Dis-
tinction When Symbolic Boundaries Are Breached 4 (Sept. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
222 See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV.
809 (2010).
223 See id. at 814 ('We are thus increasingly relying on intellectual property law not so much
to enforce social hierarchy as simply to conserve .. . our system of consumption-based social
distinction and the social structures and norms based upon it.").
224 See id at 818-19 ("With their ability rapidly to reproduce and disseminate imitations of
distinctive material goods, [mimetic] technologies are destroying the capacity of material goods
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The possessor of status goods implies some sort of social success. 225
We signal this social success by possessing status goods.226
This is all possible because of institutional goodwill. A certain
manufacturer possesses this institutional goodwill to become and to
maintain its position as a producer of "status goods." Of course, entities
in the position of being well-regarded producers of a status good want
to maintain that position. This, then, begs the question of why Prada or
Louis Vuitton can maintain their positions as status-goods makers? The
answer seems to be that they have tolerated, to a certain extent, the exis-
tence of imitative commodities.
Therefore, although these luxury-status-goods makers report that
they have attempted to terminate imitative commodities, actual termina-
tion of imitative commodities would harm their bottom line rather than
help it. At the very least, lumping luxury-status-goods manufacturers
such as Coach, Prada, and Louis Vuitton together with music CD and
movie producers whose products are pirated seems counterproductive.
E. Vilification
To be certain, there is much to despise about the creators of some
imitative commodities. There are dreadful stories of maltreatment of
workers. 227 There are simply horrifying stories of the use of child la-
bor.228 There are even stories of mass intimidation229 and the use of
reliably to confer distinction and are shifting the emphasis of our system of social distinction
toward the consumption of distinctive intellectual properties.").
225 See Roger Mason, Modeling the Demand for Status Goods, in MEANING, MEASURE, AND
MORALITY OF MATERIALISM 88 (Floyd Rudmin & Marsha Richins eds., 1992), available at
http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=12198 ("[Consumers] use product price as a
means of ostentatiously displaying wealth in order to gain in social status. Satisfaction derives not
from the utilitarian attributes of any given purchase but from audience reaction to the wealth
displayed by the purchaser.").
226 See id ("Satisfaction derives not from the utilitarian attributes of any given purchase but
from audience reaction to the wealth displayed by the purchaser.").
227 Author Dana Thomas discussed the dark side of the luxury industry, writing:
While customs seizures of counterfeit goods continue to rise, a vast amount makes it
through. The shipping containers are put directly onto trucks and are hauled either to
warehouses to be stored or to workshops to be assembled or stamped by clandestine
workers. This is where human trafficking fits into the puzzle: the workers, sometimes
children, have been sold into labor. They, too, have been shipped over and smuggled
in. They are taken to tenement factories and often locked in. There they live, work,
sleep. "I went on a raid in a sweatshop in Brooklyn, and illegal workers were hiding in
a rat hole," Barbara Kolsun, senior vice president and general counsel for Kate Spade,
told me. "It was filthy, and it was impossible to know how old the workers were."
THOMAS, supra note 26, at 285.
228 Thomas describes a harrowing experience she had while accompanying Chinese law en-
forcement on a raid of a factory in Guangzhou while looking for luxury-counterfeit-goods manu-
facturers:
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We hoofed it up the steps, over empty Coke cans and other trash, and as we ap-
proached the top, the acute toxic smell of glue burned in our noses. We walked into the
workshop-a long, wide room with barred windows-and before us stood two dozen
Chinese boys and girls, roughly eight to fourteen, sitting at old sewing machines and
standing behind plywood worktables littered with scraps of black leather, gooey pots
of glue, and a cookie tin filled with stamps reading Versace, Boss, Dunhill. The child-
ren stopped midwork. One bag was stuck in a machine, half sewn. In the corner were
big cardboard cartons filled with counterfeit luxury brand handbags in black leath-
er....
The cops told the children to line up single file. They looked at us with their sweet
faces filled with confusion, their eyes tired and sad: they didn't know why they were
told to stop working. As they walked out, some stopped to punch their time cards in
hope of getting paid. Some glared at the owner, an overweight middle-aged Chinese
man, and his factory manager, a Chinese woman in her thirties who sat in the small of-
fice next to the door, glum over a cold pot oftea....
When it was time to leave, we had to run across the courtyard to the vans to shield
ourselves from debris that the kids threw from the balconies. To the children, the cops
are the bad guys. Many of the children in counterfeit workshops have been sold into
labor by their families in the countryside. The children used to be picked up at the train
station and taken to the factories, but the police started to stake out the stations and
make arrests. Now factories hire agents, usually a man and woman who will pose as a
married couple and go to the country in a truck to get one or two children. If the agents
are stopped by police, the agents say that the children are theirs. Some families in the
country sell their children because they believe that the children will have a better life
in the city. But selling children has become a big business in China. The children work
in factories or turn to prostitution and send their money home or bring it to their par-
ents when they return home for the Chinese New Year. Most earn between $50 to $100
a month in factories.
The children who work in counterfeit factories are usually housed by the owners;
the kids in the raid I witnessed lived across the courtyard in slum dorms. When a coun-
terfeit factory is raided and the owner arrested, the children are left not only out of
work but also homeless.
Id. at 286-88.
229 Actual counterfeit good production has become a professional racket run by organized
crime. In New York, from the 1980s until the mid-1990s, gangs "like a group of Asian American
kids called the Born to Kill Gang-were in charge." Id. at 293. One security expert, who regular-
ly participated in counterfeit raids on Canal Street in downtown Manhattan recalled:
If we showed up to do a raid, women would take counterfeit watches, shove them up
their shirts, and say. "I'm pregnant, don't touch me!" . . . Once I saw a three-month-old
baby in a milk crate that sat on top of a case of M-80 explosives. The gangs came after
us with bats, they'd slash our tires, throw knives and significant explosives. It was ter-
rorism.
Id. The gangs that currently run the counterfeit operations on Canal Street are "grown-up gangs
from China, like the Fukienese gang, as they are known in New York, whose members come
from Fujian, a province along China's southeastern coast just across the straits from Taiwan." Id
The Fukienese gang differs from its predecessors as its members are grown-up and don't partake
in random killings because "[iut's bad for business." See id.
During a two day sweep in November 2004, New York police arrested fifty-one mem-
bers of two violent gangs and charged them with a host of crimes ranging from rack-
eteering to trafficking in counterfeit goods. Police seized $150,000 in cash and $4 mil-
lion in counterfeit merchandise carrying the names of Chanel, Gucci, and Coach. U.S.
Attorney David N. Kelley told [sic] said the gangs "achieved their dominance through
unflinching use of violence and fear." During their reign, a man who was suspected of
cooperating with police received "a beating with pipes until his bones snapped," Kel-
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torture230 to accomplish the manufacturing of some imitative commodi-
ties. Even though there are some stories of rampant use of under-
privileged people manufacturing licensed, genuine goods, 231 none of
them compare to the stories of the making of imitative commodities.
However horrible those stories, one should not allow them to af-
fect the analysis of whether these practices also inflict an economic
harm on all producers. The point of this Article is to demonstrate that
the claims of economic harm suffered by makers of all status goods are
overstated. It appears that the reason they overstate their claims, include
references to imitative commodities being linked to terrorism, and even
use over-inflated numbers to describe imitative commodities, is to get
the public sphere to do what has heretofore been a private cause of ac-
tion. Louis Vuitton spends almost $20 million a year to fight imitative
commodities. 232 On one hand, this seems significant. On the other hand,
ley said. A rival gang member was shot in the head and survived only because the bul-
let miraculously shattered against his skulls [sic].
Id at 293-94.
230 When discussing the use of child labor and torture used to create counterfeit goods, the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) unveils stories of
factories producing fake Gucci and Burberry bags where workers under the age of 16
are drafted into sweatshops. The children many of whom are orphans or separated from
their parents sew and put together goods day and night in the counterfeit factories
where many also live in squalor, some sleeping on the rotten wooden floors. The only
education they receive are the skills needed for assembly line work and they eat what
little they are given which is usually rice. These are the humble foot soldiers of coun-
terfeiting, the young, the vulnerable, the oppressed, and the exploited. Yet their labour
fuels a multibillion-dollar trade every year.
It's not just China though where such workers are found-raids carried out by well
known luxury goods manufacturers have encountered similar conditions in counterfeit-
ing factories in New York's Brooklyn suburb. Illegal workers hiding in filthy cellars
serving as counterfeiting sweatshops. Sometimes these workers are actually locked in
so that they cannot escape even in the event of a fire. Vulnerable illegal workers in Eu-
rope and North America provide a perfect target for exploitation not only in counter-
feiting sweatshops but also for other activities run by organised crime rings.
Bus. Action to Stop Counterfeiting & Piracy, The Use of Child Labour in the World of Counter-
feiting, INT'L CHAMBER COMMERCE COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (June 1, 2005),
http://www.icc-ccs.co.uk/bascap/article.php?articleid=141.
231 Id. ("Of course the broad issue of low cost child labour is a complex one. Many children in
different parts of the world have a stark choice between exploitation and starvation. Even well
known brand owners such as Nike have found themselves in the dock. In 1996 an American
magazine showed a photograph of a young Pakistani boy sewing together a Nike football. The
following year a report indicated that workers in Nike contracted factories in Vietnam were
exposed to toxic fumes up to 177 times the country's legal limit. However, since that time Nike
and other brand owners have made big strides in trying to ensure that local companies that make
its products adhere to acceptable work practices and provide good working conditions for staff.").
232 See Dana Thomas, The Cost of Counterfeiting, LOST MAG., Jan. 2009, http://www,
lostmag.com/issue29/counterfeiting.php ("Louis Vuitton, one of the world's most copied
brands, ... spends approximately $18.1 million each year fighting counterfeiting . . . ."); see also
FAQ, supra note 76.
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given that the gross income of LVMH approaches $28 billion,233
LVMH spends less than 0.07% of its gross income on enforcement.
That is, as a society, we have become convinced that all manufac-
turers of imitative commodities are bad. In fact, we vilify the makers of
all imitative commodities. 234 Some makers entirely deserve our vilifica-
tion. Maybe others do not. However, the ACTA simply vilifies makers
of imitative commodities; acquiesces to the use of pejorative terms like
counterfeiter, knockoff, or pirate; and lumps all such producers into a
class, labeling them as "bad." What if some are not? What if some are
legitimately competing in the market place? What if some are simply
using similar trademarks in a noninfringing way in order to compete?
What if the numbers upon which the ACTA is based are not accurate?
What if the claim of the connection to terrorism is overstated? The point
is that under the ACTA, we will never know the answers to these ques-
tions, and imitative-commodities producers will be treated as a class of
bad people. Historically, these so-called counterfeiters were sometimes
called competitors. We may not have sanctioned the manner in which
they produced their goods, but they were competitors nevertheless.
John Dower has written a fascinating book called The Cultures of
War.235 In it, he describes the blinding nature of vilification. Just as the
Japanese were blind to what America's response would be when they
decided to bomb Pearl Harbor, vilification blinded America's eyes as to
the response from the Iraqi people and the world at large when it en-
gaged in pre-emptive war and invaded Iraq. 236 Obviously on a much
smaller scale, the ACTA's vilification blinds us as to the significance of
imitative commodities. When the problem is extremely complex and
nuanced, the ACTA is like using a sledge hammer to kill an ant. The
ACTA provides vilification blinders.
With vilification blinders on, any amount of imitative commodities
are labeled as "bad." This vilification prevents us from asking hard
questions. How do we really know imitative commodities are bad? The
data supporting this claim are unverified and unverifiable, if not covert-
ly inflated. The ties to terrorism are overstated and only lead to fear and
further vilification. The positive effect of some imitative commodities
goes unnoticed and unmentioned. In fact, by raising these issues, I am
concerned that I will be labeled as "un-American." This vilification
gives great satisfaction to something like the ACTA. Some appear to
feel good to be doing anything in response to imitative commodities.
233 ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 67, at 6 (2010 revenue was E20.320,000,000, equiva-
lent to approximately $28,000,000,000).
234 In media and public discourse, seldom are distinctions made between different manufac-
turers of imitative commodities. See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text.
235 See JOHN W. DOWER, THE CULTURES OF WAR (2010).
236 See id. at 3-21.
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However, imitative commodities have become the weapons of mass
destruction of international trade. Before pulling out the big guns, we
ought to think carefully about the effects. The ACTA acts in total disre-
gard of the effects.
In 1906, William James wrote an essay titled "The Moral Equiva-
lent of War." 237 In it, James argues as a pacifist that war is "a transitory
phenomenon in social evolution." 238 Pacifists (in the form of those
questioning the ACTA) should first understand the ethical point of view
of their opponents (in the form of those supporting the ACTA). Under-
stand first and then move to the point of the argument and "your oppo-
nent will follow." 239 That is, the vilification of imitative commodities is
the natural growth of a society that seems condemned to seeing war as
perpetual. The so-called "War on Terror," with no beginning and no
end, leads our society to this conclusion. 240 Therefore, when confronted
with a significant issue, such as imitative commodities, our society vili-
fies it as we would vilify any enemy. What James would argue here is
that we need a moral equivalent to the war on imitative commodities
that the ACTA necessitates.
What would we see if we removed the vilification blinders? Is the
vilification of imitative commodities appropriate? Do we allow the
manner in which some imitative commodities are manufactured blind
us to the role that all imitative commodities play in the world's market
place?
F. Equilibrium Point
Based on the data gathered regarding the three luxury-status-goods
makers considered herein and various economic studies, there seems to
exist an equilibrium point at which a given business can function opti-
mally. This equilibrium point is where a given manufacturer has the
largest benefit-to-loss ratio from sharing its given market with imitative
commodities. Said another way, this point is where the legitimate good
manufacturers derive the most benefit from having the imitative com-
modities in their industry. Since this is an industry-by-industry or even
product-by-product analysis, different manufactures will experience
varying equilibrium points. Consequently, articulating a single sweet
spot for all manufacturers, industries, or products would be nearly im-
237 William James, Moral Equivalent of War, MCCLURE'S, May-Oct. 1910, at 463-68, avail-
able at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015016375688?urlappend= %3Bseq=485.
238 Id. at 464.
239 Id. at 466 (quoting J. J. Chapman).
240 See generally JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2009).
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possible without an extensive amount of data collection. Furthermore, it
has already been established that no accurate methods of this sort of
data collection have yet been established; and to rely on the current data
collection practices would be to indulge in the very conduct this Article
reproaches.
Although there is an equilibrium with imitative commodities for
which all rational firms manufacturing legitimate goods ought to strive,
these very firms and thirty-seven governments around the world are
placing all bets on killing an ant with a nuclear bomb. Rather, each
government and each manufacturer needs to determine where the equi-
librium is for each good and craft a nuanced countermeasure to imita-
tive commodities that will reach a socially, economically, and legally
optimal outcome.
CONCLUSION
It is irrational to apply a one-size-fits-all solution to the notion of
imitative commodities. To be sure, some imitative commodities are
normatively bad to any extent. However, this Article has demonstrated
that a counterfeit equilibrium must be sought out and understood for
each and every imitative commodity. Given the fact that no solid public
data exists for the value of current imitative commodities, and given
that this issue is fraught with vilification and distortions, this will be a
difficult inquiry at best. For the luxury status goods that have been the
subject of this Article, terminating imitative commodities entirely
would not be optimal. Therefore, it appears that the signers of the AC-
TA accepted an economic theory of imitative commodities rather than
dealing with a nuanced problem in a nuanced manner.
In the end, the real issue is whether we should make the interna-
tional enforcement of intellectual property rights against producers of
imitative commodities a public, rather than a private, matter. To date,
this has largely been conceived of as a private cause of action, where
intellectual property rights holders sue to prevent the importation or
distribution of imitative commodities. As such, a judge or jury consid-
ers the matter and issues an opinion; the government does not take an
immediate enforcement role.
The ACTA turns this private enforcement activity into a public du-
ty of the state. With the ACTA, various governments are now standing
firmly beside producers of imitated goods. These governments are
doing this based on unverified data, relying on a document that is not
even responsive to imitative commodities, and which was generated in
a way that allows for central governments to engage in policy launder-
ing with vague criminal sanctions. This will harm rather than benefit the
[Vol. 33:31182
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fundamental goal of providing trademark protection in the first place:
the reduction in search costs.
All of this is done in a secret manner that violates any semblance
of transparency. The ACTA should not be signed into law; it should be
rethought from the ground up, taking all thinkers' views into considera-
tion, not just those who vilify producers of imitative commodities and
antiterrorist conspiracy hawks, and not just the CEOs of major produc-
ers of occasionally imitated goods.
We ought to have a real dialogue about the real data on imitative
commodities, the real role they play in terrorism, and the real effect on
each producer of legitimate goods. We ought to avoid painting with
such a broad brush that silences all the nuances to an incredibly com-
plex topic: the role that imitative commodities play in modem, demo-
cratic markets. Finally, we need a nuanced approach to deal with an
extremely nuanced problem.
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